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Abstract

On the economic effects of policy responsiveness: The role of
candidate selection for general elections.

by

Marco Alejandro Pérez Mares
Claremont Graduate University: 2012

Policy responsiveness to the demands of the whole is important because it is a
determinant of growth and development: institutions that make governments more inclusive
favor economic progress and factors that make governments more exclusive inhibit prosperity.
Growth-enhancing policies likely to please the citizenry include policies that ensure the
prevalence of the rule of law, policies that protect property and intellectual rights, and policies
that foster competition, access and the perfection of markets. In contrast, growth-retarding
policies likely to initiate from the representation efforts of politicians advancing narrow concerns
include infringement on property rights, diffuse patent legislation, regulation to rise some price
or wage, regulation blocking the entry into specific markets, official protection to monopolistic
markets and adoption of legal barriers against international competition.
If policy responsiveness to the interests of the whole favors economic affluence, what
political institutions matter for the advancement of wide-encompassing interests through the
policy making process? This dissertation examines the idea that the incentives provided by the
intra-party candidate selection methods are crucial in order to understand the politicians’

representation efforts. Expressly, increasing participation and democratization of the intra-party
nomination process increase the incumbent’s propensity to represent wide-encompassing
interests and adopt policies that favor economic affluence. In contrast, elite-centered nomination
methods decrease the incumbent’s incentive to be politically responsive to the interests of the
whole in favor of the representation of narrow concerns that often demand policies that benefit
the group at the expense of overall economic growth.
Empirically, the idea that aspirants to party tickets must first respond to the demands of
those with the power to add their names to the electoral ballot finds robust support. In the
developed world, candidate nomination appears largely informed by inclusive and democratic
practices. Quite the opposite, in the less-developed world events of intraparty participatory
politics are for the most part absent, with nomination decisions often monopolized by national
party leaders and local party bosses.

To my father, Angel Pérez Ochoa, M.D. Thanks dad!

Acknowledgements

There are many people I would like to thank greatly for helping me make this dissertation
possible. My ideas, writing, and this finished product would not be the same without the
enthusiastic guidance of my mentors Arthur Denzau, Thomas Borcherding, Darren Filson and
Paul Zak. Thank you all, deeply, for the finest education, your encouragement in the early stages
and your invaluable insights and advice through all stages of research and writing. This
dissertation would certainly not be the same without your exceptional cleverness.
I would like to thank those who had influenced my academic and professional formation
on earlier stages; professor Javier Beristain (+), Alonso Lujambio, Otoniel Ochoa, Tonathieu
Rodriguez and Emilio Villarreal-Quintanilla. At some point in time, your going “above and
beyond” has been a source of professional challenge, intellectual growth and, somehow,
inspiration.
A special thank-you goes to all members of the Gonzalez family, Mr. and Mrs. Gonzalez,
George, Jackie and Josh. You are infinitely appreciated.
Finally, I want my dad Angel, my mom Gloria, my aunt Nina, my sister Yoyis and our
family treasure “la Beba,” to know that I greatly appreciate their company and support
throughout all these years. Mom, I know you are always there, with me. I deeply cheer being one
of you!!!

The views expresses herein are the author’s own.
April, 2012

vi

Table of Contents
Committee Listing Page

ii

Abstract

iii

Dedication

v

Acknowledgements

vi

Table of Contents

vii

List of Tables

ix

Introduction…………………………………………………………….……………………….. 1
1. Candidate Selection for General Elections in Comparative Perspective……………...… 11
1.1. Inclusive-Democratic Candidate Selection
in Single-Member Constituencies………………………………….……..………... 15
1.2. Inclusive-Democratic Candidate Selection
in Multi-Member Constituencies ………………………………….…………..…... 18
1.3. Elite-Centered Candidate Selection
in Single-Member Constituencies………………………………………….…..…... 23
1.4. Elite-Centered Candidate Selection
in Multi-Member Constituencies………………………...………………….……... 27

2. The Political Economy of Policy Responsiveness in Democratic Regimes:
The Role of Candidate Selection for General Elections….…………..………….……..… 34
2.1. The Economic Effects of Policy Responsiveness………………..………………… 37
2.2. The Institutional Determinants of Policy Responsiveness………….……………… 40
2.2.1. Policy Responsiveness: The Role of Candidate Selection……………….. 44
2.3. The Formal Approach to the Economic Effects of Policy Responsiveness……....... 49
2.3.1. A Simple Model of Policy Responsiveness with Candidate Selection…... 50

vii

2.3.1.1. The Agents.................................................................................. 52
2.3.1.2. The Single Legislator’s Problem
if Inclusive-Democratic Candidate Selection............................. 52
2.3.1.3. The Single Legislator’s Problem
if Elite-Centered Candidate Selection........................................ 56

3. Elite-Centered Candidate Selection Enables Executives Prevalence:
Evidence from Fiscal Policy in Latin America…..……………..…...........…….……....… 60
3.1. Executive Prevalence: Evidence from Fiscal Policy………………….............…… 61
3.2. The Problem of Effective Governance…….….................................................…… 64
3.3. A Simple Reciprocity Model of Coalition Bargaining
with Executive Prevalence and Elite-Centered Candidate Selection.....….......…… 66
3.3.1. The Agents….....….......….....……..............…....….........…..................… 66
3.3.2. The Single Party Leader’s Problem............................................................ 68
3.4. Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Outcomes in Latin America...............................….......…. 72
3.4.1. The Empirics: Model Specification and Variable Definitions......…......... 74
.
3.4.2. Government Expenditures and Tax Revenues.…..….….….....…...…..… 78
3.4.3. One-Term vs. Two-Term Limits................................................................ 82

Conclusions……….…………………………………………………………...….……….…… 90
Bibliography…………….………….……………………….….……...…….………………… 95

APPENDIX A. Selected References on Candidate Selection by Country.
68 Contemporary Electoral States................................................................... 110

APPENDIX B. Complete References on Candidate Selection by Alphabetical Order.
68 Contemporary Electoral States................................................................... 116

viii

List of Tables

Table 1. Policy Responsiveness by Members of National Assemblies.
68 Contemporary Electoral States, as in 2011..…..…….….….……..…….…….…..… 7
Table 2. Intra-Party Methods of Candidate Selection by Electoral System.
68 Contemporary Electoral States, as in 2011..…………………………………….… 14
Table 3. Data Sources……………………………….………………………….……..…………76
Table 4. Summary Statistics……………………………………………………………………. 77
Table 5. Government Expenditures and Executive Term Limits.
17 Latin American Electoral States, 1970-2004….………………..….…..….….….… 78
Table 6. Tax Revenues and Executive Term Limits.
17 Latin American Electoral States, 1970-2004……………………………….……… 80
Table 7. Government Expenditures and Alternative Executive Term-Limit Rules.
17 Latin American Electoral States, 1970-2004……………………………….……… 85
Table 8. Tax Revenues and Alternative Executive Term-Limit Rules.
17 Latin American Electoral States, 1970-2004……………………………….……… 87

ix

Introduction

“…Yet estimates of the sources of growth, however meticulous, subtle, and useful, do not
tell us about the ultimate causes of growth...They do not trace the sources of growth to their
fundamental causes; …neither do they explain…the “retardants” of growth (p. 4).” Olson, M.
(1982). The rise and decline of nations: Economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities. New
Heaven and London: Yale University Press.

Without doubt, unearthing the economic effects of political regimes has proved an
elusive quest. At best, the empirical literature finds less than persuasive the evidence of a
connection between political regimes and growth rates of income per capita, with the overall
effect of democracy on economic growth often regained weakly negative (Sirowy & Inkeles,
1990; Przeworski & Limongi, 1993; Barro, 1996; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi,
2000).
Despite the on-going debate on the economic effects of political regimes, in his classic
book The Rise and Decline of Nations, Mancur Olson [1982] brings attention to an empirical
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regularity: Economic affluence is regularly observed in a relatively small sub-sample of
consolidated democracies; i.e., countries with political institutions prone to advance the interests
of the whole. Policy responsiveness occurs if the institutional structure induces the ruling polity
to pursue policy frameworks that parallel those favored by the citizenry (Manin, Przeworski, &
Stokes, 1999a, p. 9; Powell, 2004, p. 91). What, if any, are the economic consequences of policy
responsiveness? Even if we admit policy responsiveness as a growth-enhancing institution, what
political institutions matter for the advancement of wide-encompassing interests through the
policy making process?
Policy responsiveness is important because it is a determinant of growth and
development. Consenting to the view that the politico-institutional structure make politicians
exceptionally receptive to the interests of the whole, policies likely to please substantial
segments of the citizenry include policies that ensure the prevalence of the rule of law and assert
human rights, policies that protect property and intellectual rights, and policies that foster
competition and the access and perfection of markets (Barro, 1997, pp. 26-28). Governments
advancing the interests of the whole may also spend on public goods such as infrastructure and
schools (Barro, 2000; Feng, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003).
These are policies that have an evident tendency to satisfy the citizenry and lead to overall
economic growth.
Quite the opposite, growth-retarding policies likely to develop from the representation
efforts of government officials advancing narrow concerns include blurry intellectual and
property rights legislation, infringement on property rights, diffuse patent legislation,
government imposed price controls, legislation to tax some types of income at lower rates than
other incomes, enactment of complex tax breaks to protect businesses, inflexible contracts to
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protect the wages of union members, regulation blocking the entry into specific lines of business,
official protection to monopolistic markets, import restrictions, and adoption of other legal
barriers against international competition (Olson, 1982, pp. 44-46; Feng, 2000; Bueno de
Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003).
On balance, the extent in which political institutions advance encompassing interests
rather than narrow concerns favors economic efficiency and the rate of economic growth. If
policy responsiveness favor the adoption of growth-enhancing policies, what political institutions
matter for the advancement of wide-encompassing interests through the policy making process?
Concerning policy responsiveness, earlier studies place regularly scheduled elections as
the paramount selection mechanism for politicians to act in the interest of constituents (Dahl,
1956; Downs, 1957; Buchanan & Tullock, 1962).1 The prospect of reelection, in particular,
makes incumbents receptive to the interests of the whole and so influences the kinds of policies
public officials pursue (Grofman, 1996). Cohen and Spitzer (1996) examine the relationship
between incumbents and voters by means of a game-theoretical model in the form of a Prisoner’s
Dilemma. The infinitely iterated game induces rational self-interested incumbents to pursue
public oriented policies that signal the incumbents’ future performance in office to voters who
look at floor voting records to decide whom to support. Denzau and Munger (1986) show that in
the U.S. Congress, the prospect of reelection combined with plurality rule in single-member
districts constraint the legislators’ propensity to serve narrow interests in favor of the
representation of the more encompassing group of regular, unaffiliated voters. Members of
1

Scholars have paid close attention to the effects that various political institutions have on policy responsiveness.
Contrary to electoral systems of proportional representation that encourage central control and adherence to party
platforms, scholars have long emphasized the keen linkages created between politicians and voters by systems of
plurality rule in single-member districts. Term limits in office lessen policy responsiveness. The electoral rule
restrains voters from using reelection to keep elected officials politically responsive and incumbents in their last
term have no incentives to serve their constituents’ interests since their efforts cannot be rewarded with an additional
term in office. Federalism increases policy responsiveness because political power is decentralized to levels closer to
the citizenry.
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congress may serve organized interests groups in exchange for campaign contributions and
political support. However, incumbents act in response to narrow concerns only if the electoral
benefits attained from the donors’ contributions exceed the costs of their unpopular policy
choices that reduce their chances of reelection by the masses. Lately, the scholarly literature
moved forward to examine the politicians’ behavior and policy choices according to the
reputation building model of politics. Rogoff’s (1990) seminal work points to the notion that
politicians’ incentive to establish a reputation through the use of public policy can have
important outcomes. The author constructs a model based on a forward looking electorate that
receives the politician’s political stances and policy choices as signals that are indicative of the
incumbent’s ability to govern. Electoral prospects create an incentive for politicians to build their
reputations with this forward looking electorate who may be judging performance based on the
politician’s performance. Only those politicians who desire to run for office again must maintain
a reputation of political responsiveness and responsible economic policy among constituents.
Hence, the re-election mechanism enhances policy responsiveness which also reduces the
incumbent’s opportunistic behavior.
This dissertation examines the notion that the incentives provided by the intra-party
candidate selection methods are crucial in order to understand the politicians’ representation
efforts. Explicitly, whose preferences will impact actual policy depends on who governs intraparty nomination decisions. Schattschneider (1942), Kirchheimer (1966), Jupp (1968) and
Ranney (1981) place the locus of power within political parties on those selecting party
nominees for electoral contestation from among the pool of eligibles.2 The logic of their

2

Although political parties usually sanction nationality, age, residence, personal conduct, and holding of public
office, only six countries legally address the candidate selection practices observed by political parties: Argentina,
Finland, Germany, Norway, Turkey and the US. For the rest of the countries in today’s western democracies,
political parties’ systems of leadership election and methods of candidate selection habitually reside within the
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argument is straight and simple: Aspirants to party tickets must first respond to the demands of
those with the power to add their names to the electoral ballot, or face the threat of losing party
nomination. While studying the Indian Congress Party, Weiner (1967) notices that candidate
nomination decisions on the hands of the national party oligarchy party make contenders to party
tickets willing to advocate the immediate concerns and national policies of party leadership (pp.
48-49). For Chaube (2003), the potential denial of re-nomination is the key element to
understand the representation efforts of a member of the legislature to the wishes of those
making nomination decisions (p. 212). Hence, together with the power to choose party nominees,
key selection groups influence the legislative work.
Consequently, increased participation and democratization of the nomination process
enhances policy responsiveness to the interests of the broader electoral constituency. Democratic
and inclusive candidate selection refers to the meaningful involvement of the mass public and
participation of the party membership in the process of choosing candidates for electoral
contestation (Sartori, 1973, pp. 19-20; Hazan, 2002, p. 117). Following Norris (1996), key
selection groups may then comprise enfranchised citizens, registered voters, grassroots party
members and democratically elected delegates at regional or national party conventions in which
nominees are selected by democratic means (p. 203).3 In his book Congress: The Electoral
Connection David Mayhew [1974] develops the case that mandatory party primaries turn
incumbents in the U.S. Congress exceptionally receptive to the demands of their electoral
constituencies, often at the point of challenging the directives of the central party leadership.
private sphere of the countries’ legal systems. Hence, in most countries, intra-party institutional structures, internal
rules, informal practices and conventions oversee the candidate selection process (See Gallagher & Marsh, 1988;
Katz & Mair, 1994).
3

In contrast, nomination decisions within parties may be centralized by small oligarchic party elites at the national
or sub-national level. In this case, key selectorates may be national and regional party bosses, influential regional
officers, and faction and affiliated interest group leaders (Norris, 1996, p.203).
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This happens because the initial step in the process of running for public office corresponds to
that of achieving party nomination -i.e., access to the electoral ballot. Inclusive-democratic
candidate selection then places potentially large selection groups as the gatekeepers in the
process of electing a new legislature. In Mayhew’s view, this condition facilitates the
incumbent’s arduous task of answering to the demands of the party’s grassroots members while
representing the interests of the electoral constituency as the policy preferences of a large
selection group draw near to those of the electoral constituency. For reasons of political survival,
incumbents choose policies and assume stances and attitudes that resemble those of the median
member within the selection group and the electoral constituency.
This dissertation builds up on these ideas connecting intra-party candidate selection to
policy responsiveness, then economic growth and development. My initial motivation is to assess
the induced propensity of incumbents in national assemblies to pursue policy frameworks that
resemble those preferred by the unorganized, yet encompassing group of regular voters. Special
attention is paid to the distinctive efforts of members of congress. By institutional design, in
democratic regimes the legislators’ choices define, for the most part, actual public policy.
I posit policy responsiveness by members of national assemblies is largely incidental on
the simultaneous occurrence of inclusive-democratic candidate selection within parties and the
availability of legislative reelection. Since legislative reelection has been customary practice
across contemporary democracies, the degree of democratization of the intraparty nomination
procedures becomes the center of attention.4 The methods employed by political parties to
choose candidates for general elections greatly vary across nations and across political parties
within nations. However, if the focal point is the occurrence or absence of a democratic process
4

Only four nations have banned legislative reelection since WWII: Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and the
Philippines. The Philippines allows up to three consecutive legislative terms since 1987 and Ecuador changed its
policy to allow for legislative reelection in 1996.
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in the intra-party nomination methods, categorization of contemporary electoral states by having
or not a politically responsive national assembly suggests an economic difference as well as a
difference in the quality of democracy supplied by the countries’ political systems (See Table 1
below).

Table 1. Policy responsiveness by members of national assemblies
68 contemporary electoral states, as in 2011
Legislative reelection
Candidate selection within political parties
Inclusive-democratic candidate selection

Elite-centered candidate selection

Australia, Canada, Iceland, Ireland,
New Zealand, Nordic Nations, UK, US,
Western Central Europe.

Africa, Asia (including Japan and the Asian
Tigers), Israel, Latin America, Southern Europe:
Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey.

Note: As in 2011, immediate legislative reelection existed in all but two nations: Costa Rica and Mexico.
See Appendix A for a list of selected references on candidate selection by country.
See Appendix B for a list of selected references on candidate selection by alphabetical order.

The economic effects as well as the political consequences of candidate selection are
identified as subjects deserving closer scrutiny. In the developed world, candidate nomination
within political parties appears largely informed by inclusive and democratic practices. In
contrast, in the less-developed world events of intraparty participatory politics are for the most
part absent, with nomination decisions often monopolized by national party leaders and local
party bosses.
If we acknowledge economic strategy as the fundamental source of economic progress
and policy frameworks as mindful choices, researchers’ efforts ought to expose the policy-
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makers’ motives. Within this line of thinking, the political economy literature often stresses
differences in political institutions in order to explain policy choices, growth and development.
While political scientists have long recognized the relevance of the methods employed by
political parties to select candidates for general elections, the economic effects of candidate
selection have attracted much less attention from researchers in the field of political economy.
This dissertation adds to the scholarly literature by connecting the degree of participation and
democratization of the methods employed by political parties to select candidates for general
elections to the adoption of characteristic policy frameworks, then growth and development.
The reminder of this dissertation is broken into four chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the
reader to the empirics of candidate selection from a cross-country, comparative perspective using
data on candidate selection by the parties in government from 68 contemporary electoral states.
Intriguingly, categorization of modern electoral states into those in which the intra-party practice
of candidate selection is carried out through democratic means and those in which party
nominations are a prerogative of the party leadership closely resembles the standard
categorization of developed and developing countries.
In Chapter 2, I argue that the apparent connection between the parties’ choice of methods
to select nominees for general elections and the countries’ economic performance is not
accidental, but causal. In order to accomplish this task, I build on Denzau and Munger (1986) to
present a model of legislative behavior that formalizes the connection between the political
institution of candidate selection, policy responsiveness, and the adoption of characteristic policy
frameworks. Expressly, if running for reelection, increased participation and democratization of
the intra-party nomination process encourages policy responsiveness, which in turn favors the
adoption of growth-enhancing policies. In contrast, elite-centered candidate selection
8
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discourages policy responsiveness to the interests of the whole in favor of the representation of
narrow concerns that often demand growth-retarding policies.
I overtly recognize that sound policy is common knowledge. Despite the politicoinstitutional environment, political leaders may choose to commit to strategies that promote
economic affluence at any time. However, if we consent to the general view of institutions as
growth determinants, the lack of incentives for politicians to act responsive to the interests of the
whole may lead to detrimental economic outcomes. Chapter 3 inquires into the effects that elitecentered candidate selection may have on actual policy. Specifically, I argue that candidate
selection on the hands of the few enables executive prevalence. A number of studies have found
executive term limits related to increases in government spending and taxes (Besley & Case,
1995; Johnson & Crain, 2004; Rose, 2006). Since effective governance requires congressional
support to pass laws, these studies raise important questions of how executives, in particular
those in institutional regimes of division of powers, are persistently successful in the arduous
tasks of building a coalition, preserve the alliance’s cohesiveness, and ostensibly lead the
budgetary process despite a likely environment of multi-party politics and periods of divided
government.5 I propose an alternative view aimed to explain executive prevalence. Members of
the governing coalition use an informal reciprocity agreement. From this angle, informal
reciprocity norms, the threat of ostracism from the governing coalition and the practice of elitecentered candidate selection facilitate coalition bargaining and put the executive in an
advantageous position to further his/her preferences over policy. Using panel data gathered from
1970 to 2004 of 17 Latin American electoral states, I find a positive and robust connection

5

Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh (2004) notice that between 1946 and 1999, coalition governments under
presidentialism formed in more than half of the cases in which official parties did not hold a majority in the
legislature.
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between presidential “lame-duck” periods and increases in government spending.6 Furthermore,
even when spending is on the increase in an executive’s binding term, the government seems
either unable or unwilling to collect revenue.
Concluding remarks follow in the last section with suggestions for new research
directions.

6

If testing the effect of term limits on the incumbent’s choice between alternative policies, legislative bodies
constitute a poor laboratory. In a country sample of 67 electoral states only four nations banned legislative reelection
since WWII: Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and the Philippines.
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Chapter 1
Candidate Selection for General Elections in Comparative Perspective

“The nominating process…has become the crucial process of the party. The nature of the
nominating procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make the nominations is
the owner of the party (pp. 64, 100).” Schattschneider, E. E. (1942). Party government. New
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

This chapter’s motivation is to bring attention to an empirical regularity. In the developed
world, the methods employed by political parties to select candidates for general elections appear
largely informed by inclusive and democratic practices. In contrast, events of intraparty
participatory politics are for the most part absent in the less-developed world, with intra-party
nomination decisions often monopolized by national party leaders and local party bosses.
Previous studies have dealt with the issue of intraparty candidate selection from a crosscountry perspective. However, nearly all of these studies pay exclusive attention to the
nomination procedures across political parties in western consolidated democracies; e.g.,
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Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Mair, 1994; Katz and Mair, 1994; Bille, 2001. This chapter
introduces the reader to the empirics of candidate selection from a cross-country, comparative
perspective using records on candidate selection by the parties in government from 68
contemporary electoral states.7 Countries in the sample in which the literature identify instances
of inclusive-democratic practices within parties are Canada and the United States in the
American continent; Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, the Nordic Nations -Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden-, Switzerland and the
United Kingdom in Western Europe; and Australia and New Zealand in Oceania. Countries in
the sample in which, away from democratic practices, nomination decisions are monopolized by
the few are Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Zambia in
Africa; Bangladesh, India, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri
Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand in Asia; Israel in the Middle East; Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela in Latin America; and
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey in Southern Europe.
In order to examine the nomination practices within political parties, scholars often rely
on the structure provided by the empirics of the “Hermens’s” proposition. In his book
Democracy or Anarchy? Ferdinand Hermens [1941] states that parties benefit from delegating
nomination decisions to constituency party branches in constituencies electing one or no more

7

See Appendix A for a list of selected references on candidate selection by country, 68 contemporary electoral
states. See Appendix B for a list of selected references on candidate selection by alphabetical order.
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than a few representatives.8 With candidates competing for one or just a few seats within a
geographical demarcation, local party organizations, rather than central party authorities, are
better positioned to select nominees in each district, since local sections are more competent to
discern the who is most likely to win the election. Given that both party nomination and the
election itself are locally determined, elected officials find in their own benefit to remain
politically responsive to their selection groups rather than to central party authorities.
Conversely, candidates competing in large multi-member constituencies tend to be
nominated through more exclusive, elite-centered selection methods. Generally speaking, in
electoral systems with large multi-member districts, the resulting distribution of seats among
political parties at the interior of the legislative body is intended to mimic the relative
distribution of votes among political parties. The electoral formula of proportional representation
implied by large multi-member districts thus entails the involvement of the central party
organization in the preparation of party lists. Party lists determine the specific order in which
candidates obtain a seat in the legislature; with candidates whose names appear at the top of a
party list enjoying a better chance to obtain a seat. In terms of policy responsiveness, because
central party authorities either determine or strongly influence the process by which political
parties generate the party lists, the incumbents’ efforts of representation are associated to the
interests of the central party leadership rather than to the people they represent. Moreover,
candidates’ and incumbents’ incentive to remain accountable to their political party leaderships
positively correlates to their desire to pursue long-run careers in the political arena. Politicians
would eventually need the support of their political parties in order to further their careers in
either the legislative or the executive branch, at the local, state, or federal levels of government.
8

District magnitude defines the number of legislative seats in dispute among competing parties in an electoral
district. Standard literature considers district magnitude of five or less seats as small, district magnitude between five
and ten as medium, and district magnitude higher to 10 seats as large.
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I follow the structure provided by the Hermens’s proposition and develop this section
accordingly. In terms of the methods employed by political parties to select candidates for
general elections, nonetheless, I find no systematic evidence in support of Hermens’s claim.
Electoral systems do not seem to have an evident impact on the parties’ choice of method to
select nominees for general elections (See Table 2 below).

Table 2. Intra-party methods of candidate selection by electoral system
68 contemporary electoral states, as in 2011
Intra-party candidate selection for general elections

Plurality rule in
single-member districts

Inclusive-democratic
candidate selection

Elite-centered
candidate selection

Australia, Canada, France,
Iceland, UK, US.

Botswana, Mali, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal and
South Africa in Africa. Bangladesh,
India, Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines,
Singapore and Sri Lanka in Asia.

Electoral
system
Proportional
representation

Austria, Belgium, Germany,
Latin America; Israel; Japan, South
Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Korea, Taiwan and Thailand in Asia;
New Zealand, Switzerland, Ireland, and Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and
Nordic Nations.
Turkey in Southern Europe.

Sources: Electoral systems, Polity IV dataset.
Political parties' candidate selection methods, individual sources.

Despite the incentives provided by the electoral system, political parties in today’s
democratic world may adopt either inclusive-democratic or elite-centered candidate selection
methods to nominate contenders for general elections.9 In particular, against Hermens’s
contention of central party control over the preparation of party lists, inclusive-democratic
candidate selection methods are observed in a number of parties in countries applying

9

In addition, a simple inspection of Table 2 reveals that, in today’s democratic world, political parties have an
imminent tendency to choose nomination methods where decisions are made by the few in institutional settings
where democratic practices are largely absent.
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proportional representation formulas, mostly across Western Continental Europe. Also against
Hermens’s argument of a likely involvement of local polities in the nomination of candidates,
exclusive-centralized candidate selection occurs in a number of parties in countries adopting
electoral formulas of plurality rule in single-member districts.

1.1. Inclusive-Democratic Candidate Selection in Single-Member Constituencies

In countries adopting plurality/majority rule to elect representatives from single-member
districts, democratic-inclusive candidate selection within political parties harmonizes with the
Hermens’s proposition. Countries in the sample applying electoral formulas of plurality/majority
rule in single-member districts and in which the scholarly literature identify instances of local
involvement in the nomination of candidates within major, government-forming political parties
include Australia, Canada, France, Iceland, the UK and the US.
In the UK, the law regulating political parties and their activities is at best vague if not
inexistent.10 British parties are thus free to conduct their internal affairs as they wish. In regard to
the selection of candidates for parliamentary elections, each political party has its own
constitution or set of individual rules governing the nomination process. Despite this, candidate
selection within British parties coincides in three important features. First, British party methods
of candidate recruitment and selection are highly bureaucratic. Strict formal rules adopted at the
national and regional levels establish elaborated bureaucratic procedures in order to select
candidates for parliamentary elections (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995). For instance, the Labour

10

Following Andrews (1999), UK’s general legislation on associations makes no explicit reference to political
parties, no laws deal exclusively with political parties as organizations, and election laws focus almost entirely on
candidate requirements rather than political parties. Party affiliations could not even be included in the electoral
ballot until 1969.
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Party has a comprehensive set of statutes establishing the specific procedure to follow in order to
screen aspirants and select candidates. Rules enable regional officers to monitor the process and
suggest that all aspirants should be asked the same questions at the final constituency interview
(Norris, 1996). In the Liberal Party, rules prescribe a multi-stage process in which party
members and party agencies repeatedly interact in order to choose nominees for general elections
(Denver, 1988).
Second, perhaps because formal party regulations deny central party agencies the power
to directly nominate a candidate for a local constituency on a regular basis (Webb, 1994, p. 120),
British parties routinely employ power-sharing schemes in order to select candidates for
parliamentary elections. Within each party, the process of candidate recruitment and selection
involve close interaction between the national headquarter and local constituencies. Following
Norris (1996), British national party agencies may play a front-loaded role by pulling together
the initial set of eligible aspirants from which local organizations may choose candidates -e.g.,
Conservative, Liberal Democrat, and Scottish Nationalist parties. British central party
leaderships may also play a back-ended role by refusing endorsement to local nominees -e.g.,
Labour, Plaid Cymru and SNP (p. 207). Candidate selection thus resembles a multi-stage process
in which aspirants have to face more than one selection group during the nomination process.
Third, although nomination processes involve bargaining and agreement between the
central party and constituency party branches, centrally determined rules provide for substantial
intra-party inclusiveness and democracy. Formal party regulations establish constituency
associations in each parliamentary district as the working organizational foundation of British
political parties (Webb, 1994, p. 120). For all practical purposes, constituency-level associations
in each parliamentary district play the meaningful role in the selection of candidates for
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parliamentary elections. The role of constituency-level party organizations entails the advertising
of vacancies in the House of Commons, the coordination of a series of meetings in order to
screen aspirants and shortlist, and the selection of the local nominees in internal elections
regularly decided by simple plurality rule (Norris, 1996). Even though party regulations provide
central party agencies with formal powers to encourage or obstruct the candidacy of individual
aspirants, empirical evidence suggests that these powers are hardly ever exercised. Ranney
(1965) found that between 1945 and 1964 only one locally selected Conservative and ten Labour
candidates were refused endorsement. Denver (1988) adds to this figures one additional case of a
locally selected Conservative and one Labour candidate being refused endorsement on political
grounds between 1964 and 1988. Indeed, for all practical purposes, within UK political parties
decisions of candidate selection for parliamentary elections are for the most part made by the
party at the ground through democratic means.
Unlike the UK, where the law governing political parties and their activities is diffuse, at
best, parties in the US enjoy legal recognition under the “Freedom of Association” clause of the
constitutional First Amendment. Moreover, Court decisions have ruled that the right of US
political parties to govern themselves takes precedent over state law. Despite this, political
parties regularly adhere to state laws governing the selection of candidates for Congress and
most other elected offices.
In the US state-regulated party primaries are paramount in the process of selecting
candidates for general elections. Since the 1960’s, the two major American political forces, the
Democrat Party and the Republican Party, have held direct primary elections in each of the 50
states in order to select candidates for general elections. Most states require parties to hold closed
primaries. Some other states prescribe open primaries in which registered Democrats,
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Republicans and independents may choose to participate in either primary. In either case, direct
primaries impede central party leaderships to promote or block nominees at the nomination
stage. Some state laws even prohibit party organizations from endorsing individual contenders to
party nomination (Katz & Kolodny, 1994, p. 31). State laws also regulate aspirants’ access to
party primary and candidates’ access to the electoral ballot. State regulations usually establish
low barriers to the entry of potential contenders. In most states, aspirants are only required to
deposit a symbolic fee and present several thousands of signatures from their supporters in order
to compete in a party convention (Burrell, 1993; Norris, 1996). Because party primaries are
customary practice and entry barriers to the political market are low, ordinary party members are
the key selection group in the process of choosing nominees to compete in general elections.11

1.2. Inclusive-Democratic Candidate Selection in Multi-Member Constituencies

Conflicting with the Hermens’s expectation of elite-centered candidate nomination in
multimember districts, inclusive-democratic candidate selection is common across political
parties in countries with national assemblies elected through proportional representation
formulas. Countries in the sample adopting electoral systems of proportional representation and
in which the scholarly literature identifies instances of local-democratic involvement in the
nomination of candidates within major, government-forming political parties include Austria,
Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland in Central Continental

11

Accordingly, the organization of US parties appears highly decentralized, with each party having state and local
branches largely independent of the national agencies (Ranney, 1981). Today, above the local level, party
conventions merely ratify the results of individual primary elections. Party conventions may also serve to accord
political platforms and party manifestos, and to clarify party issue positions that are not binding on the candidates’
behavior (Katz & Kolodny, 1994).
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Europe; Ireland in Northern Europe; Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden in the Nordic
region; and New Zealand in Oceania.12
Legal frameworks concerning political parties and candidate selection in Central
Continental and Nordic Europe are rather diffuse. Only Finland, Germany and Norway explicitly
regulate candidate nomination procedures; Norwegian parties, however, are not compelled to
follow the law. Despite this paucity of legal provisions, nomination decisions across political
parties in the region are largely made by democratic means with the parties’ rank-and-file often
playing the crucial role (Hazan, 2002, p. 114).13
The legal frameworks concerning political parties and candidate selection in Finland,
Germany and Norway are quite detailed. Germany and Norway further share an American
Heritage. Just after the Nazi surrendered on May 1945, the American, British, and French
military administrations consented to the re-organization of the German political system as long
as the goals and internal organizations of the emerging parties were satisfactorily democratic
(Bawn, 1992). In 1945, Social Democrats met to re-form the SPD, and the new Christian
Democrat Union (CDU) was officially recognized.
In order to guarantee that at least a fraction of the Bundestag would be responsive to local
constituencies, the American administration advanced the introduction of an “additional
member” electoral system. Since then, under the Electoral Law (Wahlgesetz) of 1949, half of the

12

I include Germany, Ireland and New Zealand in this category. In Germany, under the Electoral Law (Wahlgesetz)
of 1949, half of the Bundestag is elected by plurality rule in single-member districts. The other half of the Bundestag
is elected from regional closed party lists at the state (Länd) level. Proportional representation seats are allocated
among political forces to reflect in the overall composition of the Bundestag the distribution of votes at the national
level. In Ireland, the single transferable vote system (STV) requires voters to rank candidates from party lists in a
number of multi-member constituencies, each with a relatively small district magnitude. New Zealand shifted from
plurality rule in single-member districts to a mixed electoral system in 1996 after a 1993 referendum.
13

In fact, Mair (1994, pp. 5-15) and Bille (2001, p. 378) identify a trend in candidate selection across Central
Continental Europe and the Nordic nations towards higher levels of intra-party inclusiveness and democracy
between 1960 and 1990.
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Bundestag has been elected by plurality rule in single-member districts. The remaining 50% of
the seats has been allocated from regional closed party lists in order to match the share of votes
won by each political party at the state (Länd) level.
Because of the rather comprehensive regulatory framework, candidate selection across
German parties has become a relatively standardized procedure. Article 21 of the 1949 Basic
Law requires parties to organize in accordance to democratic principles. Section 17 of the 1967
Party Law makes mandatory the selection of candidates by direct secret ballot of all party
members at the constituency level, or by a district nominating committee. Paragraph 21 of the
German Electoral Law addresses intra-party nomination procedures in single-member districts.
Contenders must achieve party nomination by plurality rule and secret ballot in party primaries
or a convention of democratically elected delegates at the district level. Paragraph 27 of the
German Electoral Law addresses intra-party nomination procedures in multi-member districts.
The selection of list candidates must be either by a convention of local delegates within each
Länd or by the Länd party conference itself via extraordinary faculties. Delegates, who may
always put forward names, determine the pool of aspirants in selection conventions. Länd party
executives may only suggest a list of aspirants. Each place within a party list must be voted on
starting at the top of the list. Contenders must obtain an absolute majority of the total delegate
vote to become candidates even if there is only one candidate contesting a particular place, and
close races may be decided by run-off elections. Aspirants defeated in previous races may
compete for lower positions. Successful aspirants in single-member districts are free to pursue
dual nomination in a party list (Roberts, 1988; Poguntke & with Boll, 1992; Poguntke, 1994).
In Norway, the legal framework regulating candidate selection dates back to the electoral
reform of 1921. Members to the unicameral Storting would no longer be elected by plurality rule
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in single-member districts but from party lists in a number of multimember constituencies.
Because the 1921 electoral reform was expected to impact intraparty nomination processes, the
parliamentary commission in charge of the electoral reform was required to regulate candidate
selection. As a result of the Commission’s reliance on the well-documented American precedent,
the Norwegian Act of Nominations of 1921 recommended a convention model of candidate
selection. Although not compulsory, Norwegian parties have observed the 1921 Act of
Nominations with regularity in all but two constituencies, the province surrounding Oslo
(Akershus) and Oslo itself. Elsewhere, candidate selection for parliamentary elections has
become a relatively standardized procedure with party lists decided by democratic means in
party conventions at the constituency level (Valen, 1988, pp. 210-212).
In practice, the process of choosing nominees to Storting elections usually starts by the
regional party office appointing a 5-to-15-member constituency nomination committee that often
gives no representation to the national headquarters and only partial representation to the
constituency party agency. Following Valen (1988), the primary function of each constituency
nomination committee is drafting a provisional party list that will assist delegates to organize the
debate at the nomination convention. Local party branches rely on nomination meetings open to
the participation of dues-paying members in order to draft their proposals. Dues-paying members
in the various local party organizations elect delegates to constituency conventions through
majority rule. Delegates take final decisions on candidacies and rank ordering of party lists in
nomination conventions at the constituency level. Nomination decisions are systematically taken
by absolute majority rule in runoff elections and no automatic re-nomination is available to
incumbents. Aspirants first compete for the top position in the party list. If no candidate reaches
an absolute majority of the delegate vote, a second election is held between the two aspirants
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obtaining the most votes in the first round. All positions within the party list are filled following
the same procedure (pp. 222-225). Notably, since 1921 central party leaderships and the
government itself are legally forbidden from interfering in the selection processes at the
constituency level. National party agencies, in particular, lack the power to veto individual
candidacies already agreed at the district level (Valen, 1988, pp. 212-215; Svåsand, 1994, pp.
317-320).
In the Netherlands electoral rules prescribe a proportional apportionment of 150 seats to
the lower chamber, Tweede Kamer, of the bicameral States General, Staten-Generaal, from a
single national district. However, electoral rules allow parties to put forward party lists in 19
different administrative sub-districts if they so wish. Dutch parties have systematically chosen
this alternative convention and present sub-district lists on a regular basis (Koole, 1994).
Different from Finland, Germany and Norway, political parties in the Netherlands are
free to organize their internal affairs as they wish, and candidate selection for parliamentary
elections thus differs across parties. Despite this, the locus of power to select party nominees and
the subsequent ordering of party lists largely reside in the parties’ rank-and-file at the relevant
constituency level (Leijenaar & Niemöller, 1997, pp. 119-125). Consider, for instance, the
progressive Democrats66 (D66) that holds party primaries on a regular basis and, since the
1970s, has given party members the formal right to choose candidates and the ordering of party
lists by postal ballot (Koole 1994). In the centrist Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and the
left-wing Labour Party (PvdA), central party agencies may attempt to influence the nomination
process, often by submitting an advisory list of candidates and ranks. Yet, candidate selection in
each of the 19 electoral sub-districts is virtually monopolized by regional committees of
democratically elected delegates from the local party branches (Koole and Leijenaar, 1988). At a
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glance, the degree of centralization of the decisions of candidate selection in the liberal People’s
Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) seems rather high. As a result of an intra-party dispute
prior to the general election of 1982, VVD party branches lost their institutional prerogative over
the nomination process to an Election Council of regional delegates presided by the party
chairperson. For all practical purposes, however, the process of candidate selection begins with
each VVD sub-regional branch suggesting a list of aspirants, and the final order of party lists in
each of the 19 electoral sub-districts is determined through democratic means by a
democratically elected body of delegates to the party congress (Leijenaar, 1993).

1.3. Elite-Centered Candidate Selection in Single-Member Constituencies

Contrary to the Hermens’s stance of local involvement in the nomination of candidates to
compete in single-member constituencies, elite-centered systems of candidate nomination are
common across political parties with national assemblies elected trough plurality electoral
systems. Countries in the sample in which the literature identifies instances of nomination
decisions made by the few through undemocratic means within major, government-forming
political parties include Botswana, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal and South
Africa in Africa; and Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines, Singapore and Sri Lanka
in Asia.
In Africa, executive dominance in the form of neopatrimonialism and personal rule
hinders the emergence of independent legislative branches. Bratton and van de Walle (1997)
identify neopatrimonialism as the prevailing institutional regularity in immediate post-colonial
African regimes. Neopatrimonialism defines the incorporation of classic patrimonialism into
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modern bureaucratic institutions.14 Salient characteristics of neopatrimonial regimes include the
following. Despite the formal adoption of a written constitution, the right to rule was ascribed to
a single individual, often a president for life. Political power was concentrated on the executive
and executive acts stood unchallenged and above the law. Through its dominion over the state
apparatus, executives and inner circles engaged in systematic patronage and clientelism as the
basis of political survival. Offices in the public administration often worked to achieve personal
wealth and status, with various forms of illicit rents associated to the office (p. 270).
By the end of the twentieth century, institutional politics changed throughout the African
continent. During the 1990s, nearly all 47 sub-Saharan states became officially recognized as
multi-party electoral democracies (Doorenspleet, 2003, p. 171). Scholars then relied on the core
concept of “personal rule” to characterize African executive dominance. Cranenburgh (2003)
studies a sample of 12 African nations classifying at least as minimal democracies.15 The author
finds that, even in those countries in which multi-party and regular elections are the rule,
executives concentrate substantial degrees of political power with often “utterly missing forms of
power sharing” (p. 203). African rulers dominate the domestic policy-making processes, stand
above the law, their decisions are not subject to institutional checks and they often operate under
autocratic methods by means of commands, edicts, and decrees (Jackson & Rosberg, 1994).
Considerable arbitrary discretion, supported by social, civil and political institutions too weak to
perform checks and balances, make African personal rulers the leading executive and policy
maker.

14

See Weber (1968) and Theobold (1982) for a review of the institutional aspects of classic patrimonialism in
colonial Africa.
15

Minimal democracies are regimes with relatively free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage and the possibility of
competition in the political system.
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In today’s electorally democratic Africa, the institutional context surrounding political
parties and party politics often contributes to the strengthening of executive dominance. First,
initial movements toward multiparty elections were chronically followed by the emergence of
one-party systems, frequently without suppressive measures (Doorenspleet, 2003, p. 176).
Second, internal organizations and practices of African political parties appear largely informed
by the undemocratic heritage of the colonial rule (Salih, 2003, pp. 1-2). Instead of formal rules
governing intra-party affairs, small groups of party leaders, often founders, especially those of
the party in power, dominate party life and candidate selection (Kopecký and Mair, 2003, p.
289).16 Consequently, by the late 1990s, in countries such as Botswana, Mali, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal and South Africa, official parties frequently controlled an
overwhelming majority in parliament and acted as dependent branches of the executive
(Cranenburgh, 2003, p. 203).
Furthermore, even if rulers do not intervene in the selection and nomination of candidates
for general elections, institutional politics aimed to strength party discipline prevents the
formation of an independent legislative branch. In addition to the chronic formation of one-party
systems and controlled intra-party competition, Bratton and van de Walle (1997) identify high
legislative turnover (weakening party personalities relative to the executives) and generous
salary and allowances (related to the capacity of members of parliament to access positions in the
public administration and engage in redistribute patronage) as conditions lessening legislative
independence. Cranenburgh (2003, p. 205) adds the threat of expulsion from parliament as a
measure discouraging party defection and conducive to a docile majority in the legislature.
16

Despite the enduring control of party elites over party life, the literature records a few attempts to institutionalize
competitive candidate selection within African political parties. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) identify several
instances with at least one intra-party competitive election: Cameroon and Togo in the 1980s; Kenya, Tanzania and
Zambia in the 1970s; and Côte d’Ivoire after 1980 (p. 71). In these countries, ruling parties held competitive party
primaries or presented multiple candidates in the electoral ballot.
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Following Salih (2003), democratically elected legislatures in African are, with the notable
exception of Botswana, Africa’s longest democratic tradition, “nothing more than rubber-stamp
officials” (p. 30).
In India, between the first general elections of 1952 and up to 1977, the Indian National
Congress Party (NC) ruled unchallenged de facto national politics despite the development of an
increasingly multi-party system, free suffrage and regular elections. Although it returned to
power two years later, the NC was successfully challenged in the 1977 parliamentary elections
by a multi-party coalition headed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Since then, Indian politics
has developed into a consolidated multiparty system drifting towards increasing party
fragmentation, factionalism and regionalism (Jana & Sarmah, 2002; Pai, 2002).
Even though party politics has become increasingly competitive, decisions on candidate
selection for general elections across political parties remain highly centralized on the hands of
the few. A report submitted in 2002 by The National Commission to Review the Working of the
Constitution (available at www.lawmin.nic.in) reveals that, over the last fifty years after
independence, political parties exhibit unclear criteria governing candidate selection, show a
marked absence of intraparty democratic practices, and deny a meaningful role to local polities
in the selection of candidates for general elections (p. 425).17 Of particular relevance to Indian
politics is the National Congress Party, today’s only Indian party with national presence. In the
NC, the degree of centralization of candidate selection decisions has always been rather high.
Following Dasgupta (2002, p. 25) and Chandra (2004, p. 103), the NC reached its highest level
of centralization in 1972 when Indira Gandhi, then party leader of the NC, made the right to allot
party posts and nominations the formal and exclusive prerogative of the national leadership.

17

In order to control bossism within party parties, the Report suggests the introduction of democratic procedures for
the nomination of party candidates by primary elections or by giving a significant say to local party units.
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1.4. Elite-Centered Candidate Selection in Multi-member Constituencies

In countries electing members to their national assemblies from multi-member
constituencies, elite-centered candidate selection harmonizes with the Hermens’s notion of
central party leaderships being decisive at preparing party lists. Countries in the sample adopting
electoral formulas of proportional representation in which the literature identify instances of
nomination decisions made by the few through exclusive and undemocratic means within major,
government-forming political parties include Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand in Asia,
Israel in the Middle East; Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela in Latin America; and Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey
in Southern Europe.
In Japan, for instance, the Constitution of 1946 establishes a parliamentary democracy
that grants exclusive power over legislation to the bicameral National Diet (Kokkai). Between
the two constitutive chambers of the National Diet, the Japanese constitution further affirms the
supremacy of the House of Representatives (Shugiin) over the House of Councillors (Sangiin) by
vesting the former with exclusive faculties over the appointment of the prime minister, the
enactment of laws and the discussion and approval of the annual budget and international
treaties.
Since inception of direct democracy after WWII and up to 1994, the Japanese electoral
law prescribed simple majority rule and a single non-transferable vote system (SNTV) in multi-
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member districts to elect members to the House of Representatives.18 An electoral reform in
1994 changed the formula to elect members to the Shugiin to a two-ballot system overlapping
plurality rule in a number of single-member districts and proportional representation in 11 multimember constituencies. Although multi-party politics has been the rule since inception of direct
democracy, the Liberal Democratic (LDP) has largely dominated national politics. From
foundation in 1955 until the general election of 1993, only in 1976 and 1980 had the LDP relied
in coalition politics in order to lead government.
In Japan, the nomination of candidates to Shugiin elections is carried out under a
bureaucratic setting of party constitutions and rulebooks empowering national and factional party
leaders with the authority to decide on the selection and nomination of candidates. Following
Hrebenar (1992), Japanese parties fit Duverger’s 1964 definition of “cadre” party with highly
centralized structures, exclusive membership and well-organized and cohesive intra-party
factions competing for political influence and financial resources. Accordingly, Shiratori (1988)
and Fukai and Fukui (1992) identify intra-party personality-led factions as the key selection
groups in the nomination of candidates.
In Latin America, all through the region, candidate nomination is either solely on the
hands of the national party leadership or regional party bosses and leaders of intraparty factions
control the selection of candidates to general elections (Jones & Hwang, 2005, p. 267). For
instance, in Argentina, the Constitution prescribes a presidential and federal system of
government with a bicameral legislature. Election of representatives to the lower chamber occurs
through a proportional representation formula with closed party lists. Electoral rules establish 23
provincial territories and the federal capital as to form 24 electoral districts with varying district

18

In Japan, operation of the SNTV up to 1994 meant that each elector had a single vote to cast in districts electing
between three and five members to the Shugiin.
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magnitude. Since 1946, only three political parties have ever played a meaningful role at the
national level: the Peronist Party (Partido Justicialista, PJ), the Radical Civic Union (Unión
Cívica Radical, UCR) and only recently the Solidarity Country Front (Frente País Solidario,
FREPASO). In all three major political forces, party leaders at the provincial level often play the
decisive role in the selection of candidates and rank-ordering of party lists (Escudero, 2001).
Argentinean governors, in particular, enjoy political recognition and access to public resources
that furnish them with effective control over the selection of candidates to legislative elections
(De Luca, Jones and Tula, 2002).
In Brazil, as in Argentina, the electoral rule to elect members to the lower chamber is a
proportional representation formula applied to a number of multi-member districts. The Brazilian
party system, however, greatly differ from most party systems in the Latin American region. In
Brazil, the party system is highly fractionalized with just a few parties maintaining a national
presence and a large number of political forces playing a relevant role only at the local and
regional level.
In regard to the nomination of candidates for general elections, Guzman and Sena de
Oliveira (2001) give an account of the crucial role played by the national party leaders and
regional party bosses in some of the most relevant national political forces: the Labor
Democratic Party (Partido Democratico Trabalhista, PDT), the Brazilian Democratic Movement
Party (Partido del Movimento Democratico Brasilero, PMDB), and the Brazilian social-democrat
Party (Partido de la Social Democracia Brasileña, PSDB). Together with national and regional
party officials, Samuels (2002) uncovers the meaningful role played by the Brazilian state
governors at preparing party lists when the selection of candidates is carried out at party
conventions. Moreover, history shows that state governors have been decisive at determining the
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future fate of incumbents in the Brazilian lower chamber as many of them come from and will
continue their careers at the state level, a condition lessening legislative independence.
Unlike any other country in the Latin American region, Brazilian parties are legally
required to include in their party lists the name of those incumbents willing to run for reelection
(candidato nato). At a first sight, the candidate nato stipulation may seem to increase the
incumbents’ incentive to remain responsive to regular voters instead of those in the party
hierarchy preparing the party list. However, Brazilian party leaders benefit from a set of
institutional prerogatives aimed to compel party discipline. Among these conditions
strengthening central party control over individual legislators, Cheibub, Figueiredo and Limongi
(2000) expose the power of party leaders to include in each party list more candidates than seats
available for competition; control over the candidates’ access to free TV time; control over
committee assignments, the legislative agenda, and the amendment process; and the relevance of
the political parties to advance the politicians’ political careers.
In Chile, the binomial electoral system is fundamentally a proportional representation
formula with large minority representation. Applied in a number of two-member districts, the
binomial system allocates both seats to the parties polling the largest number of votes, unless the
leading political force doubles the number of votes of its closest competitor. In this case, the
leading party takes both seats in the electoral district.
Since re-inception of direct democracy in 1989 after a period of military rule, the Chilean
binomial formula has produced two long-lasting coalitions with national presence: the
“Concertación por la Democracia” and the “Alianza por Chile”. However, the coalition essence
of the Chilean party system does not favor the democratization of the candidate selection
processes. Following Scully (1995) and Siavelis (2002), in order to guarantee coalition
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cohesiveness, party leaders must engage in negotiations that require discretionary decisions in
the nomination of candidates and high levels of party discipline.
In sharp contrast to the tradition of local-democratic candidate nomination methods found
in Continental and Northern Europe, scholars identify instances of rather elite-centered candidate
selection across parties in Southern Europe. In Spain and Portugal, partisan decision-making and
candidate selection are carried out by undemocratic means and outside the realm of regular party
members (Kohler, 1982). Candidate nomination reaches utterly levels of centralization in
Greece, Italy and Turkey, with political parties built around individual personalities and national
party leaders monopolizing candidate nomination decisions.
In Greece, the electoral law stipulates a 3-tier open-list proportional representation
system to elect 300 members to the national assembly from 56 local districts, 13 regional multimember constituencies, and a single national district. Since the 1970s, when Greece became fully
democratic after a period of authoritarian regime, the country has developed into an effective
two-party system. Today, only the conservative New Democracy (ND) and the socialist PASOK
play a meaningful role in national politics. In the ND as well as in the PASOK, national party
leaders directly control candidate nomination (Gallagher, 1988a, p. 244). In particular, at its 1977
national congress, ND party members made the practice of elite-centered candidate selection
official by approving complete authority over the nomination of candidates for general elections
to the national party leader (Kohler, 1982, p. 121).
Ever since 1948, Italy has been a republican unitary state and semi-parliamentary
democracy with a bicameral legislature. Since the Italian constitution makes no specific
distinction between the upper Senato della Repubblica and the lower Camera dei Deputati,
legislative authority is equally vested in both houses,
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From 1948 and up to 1993, members to the Italian bicameral legislature were elected
simultaneously, for terms that may not exceed five years, through a formula of proportional
representation applied to a number of multimember districts (open-list for the lower chamber,
closed-list for the upper chamber). Even though the Italian Constitution has always recognized
political parties as organizations since return to direct democracy after WWII, in pre-1993 Italy
there was no legal framework regulating the intra-party nomination practices for parliamentary
elections (Wertman, 1988). During this period, Bille (2001) identify national party organs largely
controlling candidate nominations and central leaderships’ influence going beyond that stipulated
in the rules. Particularly relevant in pre-1993 Italy was the Christian Democratic Party (CD).
Even though Italy has been a multi-party democracy since the 1940s with at least eight parties
obtaining continuous representation in Parliament, the CD was able to lead most governing
coalitions. In regard to candidate selection within the CD, rule books precluded regular party
members from participating in the nomination process. Instead, party rules favored provincial
CD’s top organs as the key selection groups in the nomination process, with provincial party
decisions subject to the approval of the national leadership (Wertman, 1988, p. 149).
The breakdown of the First Republic in the 1990s brought, after an April 1993
referendum, the adoption of new electoral rules. Members to the Italian Parliament in both
houses are now elected under a two-ballot mixed formula with roughly 75% of the seats filled by
plurality rule in single-member districts and 25% by a system of proportional representation. In
contemporary Italy, Bardi and Morlino (1994) identify centralized control over parliamentary
recruitment and the power of the national party leadership to determine parliamentary behavior
as continuing well effective into the 1990s despite the introduction of new electoral rules in 1993
(p. 260).
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A simple cross-country inspection of the intra-party nomination practices to select
candidates for general elections reveals an empirical regularity. Political systems in countries
with government-forming political parties following inclusive-democratic nomination methods
are prone to advance economic progress as well as civil and political rights. Quite the opposite,
political parties in the less developed world habitually choose exclusive-centralized candidate
selection methods. The next chapter sets out to investigate the economic effects of candidate
selection of candidate selection.
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Chapter 2
The Political Economy of Policy Responsiveness in Democratic Regimes:
The Role of Candidate Selection for General Elections

“Commerce and manufacturers can seldom flourish long in any state which does not
enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure in the
possession of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not supported by law, and in which
the authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the payment of
debts from all those who are able to pay. Commerce and manufacturers, in short, can seldom
flourish in any state in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of
government (p. 539).” Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of
nations. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd.

After decades of scholarly work, the debate concerning the economic effects of political
regimes is far from settled. In principle, democratic governance advocates political rights and
civil liberties; both factors that advance property and contractual rights that, in turn, promote
security to work and save, efficient investments and encourage the flow of information in the
markets. Ostensibly, democracy precludes reckless expropriation of resources and assets, and
predisposes the development of third-party mechanisms of contract enforcement. Yet,
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democratic governments, rather than authoritarian regimes, have an understandable tendency to
respond to the public’s political pressures and demands. Universal suffrage and the right of
workers to unionize threaten private property and property rights, both critical elements for
economic affluence (North, 1990). On the other hand, authoritarian regimes vest rulers with the
essential command and control to carry out the economic reforms needed to foster growth and
development. However, there is nothing to ensure that the autocrats’ commitment will be to
growth-enhancing policies. And even if conditions for such commitment do exist, autocrats may
not be able to prove this a lasting pledge (Olson, 1991).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the empirical literature examining the economic effects of
political regimes reports mixed results. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi’s (2000)
study of 135 economies find little evidence of a trade-off between the form of government and
growth rates of total income. Barro (1996) analyzes the relationship between democracy and
economic performance for a sample of 100 countries. After controlling for the rule of law,
economic freedom, government consumption, and human capital, the overall effect of democracy
on economic growth appears weakly negative. After surveying 21 cross-country studies,
Przeworski and Limongi (1993) find less than persuasive the evidence of a connection between
political regimes and income per capita growth rates. Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) review thirteen
cross-national quantitative studies on the relationship between systems of government and the
pace of economic growth; four of which find a positive although conditional correlation, three
regain a negative association, and six report no connection whatsoever. Indeed, if we accept the
role of political institutions as economic growth determinants, differences in political regimes
may not be noteworthy.
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Despite the on-going debate on the economic effects of political regimes, in his classic
book The Rise and Decline of Nations, Mancur Olson [1982] exposes an empirical regularity:
economic affluence is regularly observed in a relatively small sub-sample of consolidated
democracies; i.e. countries with political institutions prone to advance the interests of the whole.
In the previous chapter, I presented supportive evidence that in the developed world,
intra-party candidate selection for general elections is largely informed by inclusive and
democratic practices. Quite the opposite, in the less-developed world events of intraparty
participatory politics are for the most part absent, with nomination decisions often monopolized
by national party leaders and local party bosses. In this chapter, I develop the case that the above
empirical regularity is not accidental, but causal. In line with Olson (1982), who works the case
that politicians with an incentive to respond to the demands of the whole favor the adoption of
growth-enhancing policies, I argue that the incentives provided by the intraparty candidate
selection practices are crucial in order to understand the politicians’ representation efforts, then
growth and development. Explicitly, if running for reelection, inclusive-democratic intra-party
nomination methods turn politicians receptive to wide-encompassing interests and inclined to
pursue policies that favor economic affluence. Conversely, away from democratic practices,
nomination decisions on the hands of the few turn incumbents responsive to narrow concerns,
hence inclined to pursue policies that may benefit the few at the expense of overall economic
growth.
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2.1. The Economic Effects of Policy Responsiveness

Policy responsiveness occurs if the institutional structure induces the ruling polity to
pursue policy frameworks that parallel those favored by the citizenry (Manin, Przeworski, &
Stokes, 1999a, p. 9; Powell, 2004, p. 91). Policy responsiveness is important because it is a
determinant of growth and development: Institutions that make governments more inclusive
favor economic affluence and factors that make governments more exclusive inhibit prosperity.
For instance, in order to explain variations in growth rates of income per capita, Olson
(1982) builds on the notion that the incentives facing encompassing organizations are different
from those facing organizations representing only a narrow segment of the society. Sufficiently
encompassing organizations have an important incentive to be actively concerned about how
productive the society is because members of these organizations expect to internalize much of
the cost of inefficient policies. Accordingly, inclusive organizations give some weight to
economic growth and the interests of society as a whole (p. 53).
Quite the opposite, Olson (1982) expects small, special-interest organizations such as
coalitions, cartels, lobbying organizations, professional associations, labor unions, trade
associations and oligopolistic collusive groups to engage in rent seeking to derive economic rents
from programs and policies that bring direct benefits to their members, even if these programs
imply a loss in overall economic efficiency and aggregate output. Olson explains his logic by
noticing that interest groups typically represent only a miniscule percentage of the population
and the costs of the policies fell disproportionately on the unorganized (p. 43). One of the
obvious ways in which a special-interest group can increase the income of its members while
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reducing the efficiency and output of the society is by lobbying for legislation to raise some price
or wage or to tax some types of income at lower rates than other income (p. 44). Another way is
through cartelization; members of the interest group can collude to reduce output and set a higher
price just as a single monopolist would have done (p. 43). Moreover, effective cartels must
always block entry into the line of business in which they have raised the price. Lobbying for
legislation that creates permanent barriers to entry deters new firms to come into the line of
business by making initial investments and costs greater (p. 46).
In their 2003 Logic of Political Survival, Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and
Morrow advance the Selectorate Theory. The Selectorate Theory addresses how political
institutions for selecting leaders shape the incentives the politicians in power have to pursue
policies that promote or inhibit growth and prosperity. The authors build upon two basic
concepts: the “selectorate” that represents the citizenry with an institutional right to participate in
choosing the country’s government and the “winning coalition,” a subset of the selectorate that
includes those whose support is essential to maintain the incumbent leader in office; defection
from any member of this group implies the leader’s removal. On the premise that leaders allocate
resources to most efficiently reward the group whose backing is essential to keep them in office
(p.173), holding the size of the selectorate constant, leaders who are backed by a small coalition
have an obvious tendency to use private rewards that only benefit coalition members. As the
winning coalition increases in size, incumbents find in their own benefit to pursue publicly
oriented policies and pour spending resources on public goods for their coalition of supporters.
To the extent that prosperity is widely valued, leaders backed by large winning coalitions and a
large selectorate have incentives to pursue policies that promote economic affluence. Hence,
universal suffrage, in general, and majoritarian systems, in particular, create a strong push for
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leaders to pursuit good policies than do other systems with smaller winning coalitions. In a few
words, leaders whose base of support is small necessarily favor narrow programs and spending
that merely reward coalition members, often at the expense of public welfare. Conversely,
leaders who need the support of a large coalition to remain in office promote social welfare and
economic affluence by pursuing policies and programs likely to benefit the whole.
Briefly, growth-enhancing policies likely to please the citizenry include policies that
ensure the prevalence of the rule of law and assert human rights, policies that protect property
and intellectual rights, and policies that foster competition and the access and perfection of
markets (Barro, 1997, pp. 26-28). Governments advancing the interests of the whole may also
spend on public goods such as infrastructure and schools (Barro, 2000; Feng, 2000; Bueno de
Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003). These policies have an evident tendency to satisfy
a large number of citizens and lead to overall economic growth. Growth-retarding policies likely
to develop from the representation efforts of public officials advancing narrow concerns include
blurry intellectual and property rights legislation, infringement on property rights, diffuse patent
legislation, government imposed price controls, legislation to tax some types of income at lower
rates than other incomes, enactment of complex tax breaks to protect businesses, inflexible
contracts to protect the wages of union members, regulation blocking the entry into specific lines
of business, official protection to monopolistic markets, import restrictions, and adoption of
other legal barriers against international competition (Olson, 1982, pp. 44-46; Feng, 2000; Bueno
de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003).
On balance, the extent in which political institutions advance encompassing interests
rather than narrow concerns assists economic efficiency and the rate of economic growth. If
policy responsiveness favors the adoption of growth-enhancing policies, what political
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institutions matter for the advancement of the interests of the citizenry through the policy making
process?

2.2. The Institutional Determinants of Policy Responsiveness

The scholarly literature has evolved to acknowledge policy responsiveness as a variable
identifiable along a multi-point scale, depending upon specific institutional arrangements
(Powell, 2004; Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin, 1999b). For instance, Powell (2004) looks at
policy responsiveness in democratic regimes as an outcome of an ongoing and dynamic multistage process that begins with the policy preferences held by citizens, and moves through stages
such as the citizens’ voting behavior, election outcomes, coalition and government formation,
and the policy-making process itself. In Powell’s view, systematic policy responsiveness may
arise through the adoption of enforcing mechanisms of horizontal and vertical accountability at
every stage of the chain of political responsiveness.19
Within the above line of thinking, the scholarly literature pays attention to the effects that
several political institutions have on the politicians’ propensity to represent the broader interests
through the policy-making process. Concerning policy responsiveness, earlier studies place
regularly scheduled elections as the paramount selection mechanism for politicians to act in the
interest of constituents (Dahl, 1956; Downs, 1957; Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). The prospect of
reelection, in particular, makes incumbents receptive to the interests of their constituencies and
19

Noticeably, along the literature on democratic institutions and policy responsiveness prevails the view that
effective electoral competition and regular elections are at best necessary, yet insufficient instruments of control to
keep politicians receptive to the interests of their constituencies. Arguably, for reasons of political survival, voters’
power to replace an unpleasant government through regular elections would make politicians receptive to the
demands of their constituencies. However, the complexity of institutional arrangements in which modern
democracies present themselves makes uncertain the emergence of policy responsiveness (Manin, Przeworski, &
Stokes, 1999b, p. 50).
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thus influences the kinds of policies public officials pursue (Grofman, 1996).20 For instance,
Cohen and Spitzer (1996) inquire into the effects that reelection and term limits have on the
politicians’ policy choices. Using a game-theoretical model in the form of a Prisoner’s Dilemma,
the authors show that the infinitely-iterated game induces rational, self-interested incumbents to
pursue public oriented policies. These policies signal the incumbents’ future performance in
office to regular voters who look at floor voting records to decide whom to support. In the
infinitely-iterated game, policy responsiveness increases the incumbents’ chances to stay in
office. Denzau and Munger (1986) show that in the U.S. Congress, the prospect of reelection
combined with plurality rule in single-member districts curb the legislators’ propensity to serve
narrow interests as opposed to the interests of the more encompassing group of the regular,
unaffiliated voters. Politicians serve organized interests groups in exchange for campaign
contributions and political support. However, incumbents act in response to the often growthretarding demands of private interests only up to a point in which their policy choices do not
harm their chances of reelection by the growth-oriented masses.
Lately, the scholarly literature moved forward to examine the politicians’ policy choices
according to the reputation building model of politics. Rogoff’s (1990) seminal work points to
the notion that the incumbents’ incentive to establish a reputation through the use of public
policy can have important outcomes. The author constructs a model based on a forward looking
electorate that receives the politician’s political stances and policy choices as signals that are
indicative of the incumbent’s ability to govern. Electoral prospects create an incentive for
politicians to build their reputations with this forward looking electorate who may be judging
performance based on the politician’s performance. Those politicians who desire to run for office

20

Reelection refers to the institutional prerogative of incumbents to compete for re-nomination and run for office in
consecutive terms.
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in consecutive terms must maintain a reputation of political responsiveness and responsible
economic policy among constituents. Hence, the re-election mechanism enhances policy
responsiveness which also reduces the incumbent’s opportunistic behavior.
In contrast, term limits in office lessen policy responsiveness. The electoral rule restrains
voters from using the re-election mechanism to keep incumbents politically responsive. In the
Cohen and Spitzer’s (1996) Prisoner’s Dilemma model, term limits produce a non-cooperative
outcome. Term limits suppress the electorate’s control over the incumbents’ representation
efforts by denying voters the opportunity to express satisfaction or disagreement with the
conduct of their representatives. Consequently, incumbents lose the incentive to respond to the
demands of their constituencies because voters cannot reward politicians, even those publicoriented, with an additional term in office. Indeed, incumbents in their last term may not be
prevented from pursuing policies different from those preferred by their constituencies
(Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Cohen & Spitzer, 1996).21 Concerning the economic effects of term
limits, Besley and Case (1995), Johnson and Crain (2004) and Rose (2006) have confirmed that
executive term limits are related to increases in public spending, tax revenue and fiscal volatility.
These findings are attributed to the lack of incentives lame-duck executives have to stay
responsive to the electorate since a good reputation in matters of economic policy will be of no
use for the politicians’ future political purposes (Rogoff, 1990).
Electoral systems may impact political responsiveness. Contrary to systems of
proportional representation that encourage central control and adherence to party platforms,

21

In addition, term limits in office have been related to a number of phenomena influencing policy outcomes. Term
limits remove experience and professionalism from the legislature and strengthen the role and influence of interest
groups vis-à-vis with the legislature (Polsby, 1991, 1993). Legislative term limits cause a shift of power towards a
more powerful executive (Glazer & Wattenberg, 1996). In addition to shifting the balance of political power away
from the legislature, legislative term limits shortens the incumbents’ time-horizon preferences over the legislative
work (Cohen & Spitzer, 1996; Gerber & Lupia, 1996; Sartori, 1994; Verney, 1992).
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scholars have long emphasized the keen linkages created between politicians and voters by
systems of plurality rule in single-member districts.22 Carey and Shugart (1995) develop a
method for estimating the relative value to candidates and incumbents to develop personal
reputations, as opposed to party reputations, in order to advance their political careers. After
controlling for four variables common to all electoral systems, namely access to the electoral
ballot, vote pooling, the way in which voters are allowed to cast their votes and district
magnitude, the authors’ method produces a multi-point ordinal scoring individual candidates’
incentive to develop personal or party reputations. Overtly, plurality rule in single-member
districts induces the highest propensity of contenders to identify and represent the immediate
concerns of their constituents.23
Federalism is thought to increase policy responsiveness. The normative view to this line
of thought can be traced back to Tiebout’s (1956) “pure theory of local expenditures.”
Accordingly, federalism brings about forces that resemble those of a free market. Sub-national
governments compete with each other for taxpayers that make their residential location decisions
depending on the jurisdictions’ offerings of services, provision of public goods, and levels of
taxes. Because political power is decentralized to levels closer to the citizenry, federalism

22

However, an opposing view maintains that systems of proportional representation tend to reproduce in congress
the citizenry’s ideological distribution and so may be related to greater policy responsiveness than systems of
plurality rule in single-member districts.
23

Empirical studies have found supporting evidence that electoral systems influence policy choices and outcomes.
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) and Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2007) find that countries electing
legislatures through proportional representation systems tend to indulge in fiscal indiscipline with respect to those
applying plurality rule in single-member districts. Proportional representation, particularly in large multi-member
districts, deteriorates budget outcomes because the electoral rule increases the likelihood of more fragmented
legislatures and coalition governments. Following Tullock (1959), fragmented legislatures induce fiscal imbalances
because individual claimants cannot be held entirely responsible for the problems associated to a deteriorating
budget. To the extent that the benefits from spending accrue to each claimant, while the costs are spread over all
members in the coalition, spending transfers increase and fiscal deficits emerge regardless the countercyclical
purpose of fiscal policy. As a result, in the long run, government debt tends to be excessively high (Velasco, 2000,
pp. 108-109). Briefly, electoral systems of proportional representation are likely to induce deteriorating budgets
because the electoral formula increases the likelihood that a “problem of the commons” in fiscal policy will develop.
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enables local government officials to tailor programs, taxes and expenditures in order to attract
household and businesses who vote with their feet (Musgrave, 1959, 1999; Oates, 1972, 1977,
Elazar, 1987, Weingast, 1995). To the extent that households and businesses are free to make
their own residential location decisions, federalism creates the right incentives for local
politicians to learn and respond to the heterogeneous demands of the local communities.24

2.2.1. Policy Responsiveness: The Role of Candidate Selection

A research topic largely overlooked by the political economy literature, this section
examines the notion that the incentives provided by the intra-party candidate nomination
methods are crucial if we want to understand the politicians’ representation efforts.25 The
positive stance is simple: Aspirants to party tickets, either newcomers or incumbents interested
on reelection, must first respond to the demands of those with the power to add their names to
the electoral ballot.
In democratic regimes, political parties have long remained the main gatekeepers in the
process of candidate recruitment for public office above organized interest groups, donors and
the media (Norris, 1996, p.192). In a context of legal constraints, intra-party rules, informal
conventions and even traditions, candidate selection within parties may develop in several

24

However, the economic effects of federalism are still under debate. Oates (1972) contends that jurisdictions
competing with each other for taxpayers may lead to suboptimal taxation, hence underprovision of public goods.
Treisman (1999) shows that failure to coordinate economic policy across levels of government leads to fiscal
indiscipline and macroeconomic instability. Wibbels (2001) find evidence that higher subnational spending and
deficits lead to larger deficits at the national level.
25

The political parties’ methods of candidate selection may be more influential at shaping the workings of
democratic systems than previous studies on democratic responsiveness have implied up today. Sartori (1976),
Schlesinger (1991) and Katz (2001) identify candidate nomination procedures as a defining characteristic of political
parties in democratic regimes. For Bille (2001), a political regime ought to be classified as democratic only if it
provides for the institutional mechanisms advancing public influence and participation within political parties.
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dimensions. Following Norris (1996), nomination decisions may be open to a large group
beyond party membership or limited to the participation of party members. Nomination
processes may be open to public scrutiny or carried out in privately held meetings. Candidate
nomination decisions may also be centralized by a small number of influential party members or
dispersed across party branches. Key selection groups may then comprise enfranchised citizens,
registered voters, grassroots party members, delegates at regional or national party conventions,
regional officers, factions, affiliated interest groups, or national party leaders (p. 206).
Concerning policy responsiveness, whose preferences impact actual policy depends on
who governs intra-party nomination decisions. Schattschneider (1942), Kirchheimer (1966), Jupp
(1968) and Ranney (1981) place the locus of power within political parties on those choosing
party nominees for electoral contestation from among the pool of eligibles. The logic of their
argument is straight and simple: Aspirants to party tickets must first respond to the demands of
those with the power to add their names to the electoral ballot or face the threat of losing party
nomination. While studying the Indian Congress Party, Weiner (1967) notices that candidate
nomination decisions on the hands of the national party oligarchy party make contenders to party
tickets willing to advocate the immediate concerns and national policies of party leadership (pp.
48-49). For Chaube (2003), the potential denial of re-nomination is the key element to
understand the conformity of a member of the legislature with the wishes of those making
nomination decisions. Even elected officials must answer to the party gatekeepers’ demands or
face the threat of losing party nomination at the time of the next election (p. 212). Hence,
together with the power to select party nominees, key selection groups greatly influence the
incumbents’ representation efforts.
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Amongst the different dimensions in which intra-party candidate selection may develop,
increased participation and democratization of the nomination process enhances policy
responsiveness. Democratic and inclusive candidate selection refers to the meaningful
involvement of the mass public and participation of the party membership in the process of
selecting candidates for general elections (Sartori, 1973, pp. 19-20; Hazan, 2002, p. 117).
Following Norris (1996), key nomination groups may then comprise enfranchised citizens,
registered voters, grassroots party members and democratically elected delegates at regional or
national party conventions in which nominees are selected by democratic means (p. 203).
For instance, in his classic book Congress: The Electoral Connection David Mayhew
[1974] develops the case that mandatory party primaries turn incumbents in the U.S. Congress
particularly receptive to the demands of their electoral constituencies, often at the point of
challenging the directives of the national party leadership. This happens because the initial step
in the process of electing a new legislature corresponds to that of achieving party nomination i.e., access to the electoral ballot. Inclusive-democratic candidate selection then places
potentially large selection groups as the gatekeepers in the process of electing a new legislature.
Moreover, in Mayhew’s view, party primaries facilitate the incumbents’ arduous task of
responding to the demands of the party’s grassroots members while representing the interests of
the electoral constituency as the policy preferences of a large selection group draw near to those
of the electoral constituency. For reasons of political survival, incumbents choose policies and
assume stances and attitudes that resemble those of the median member in the selection group
and the electoral constituency. As a result, in the US Congress, legislating and voting in
accordance to the perceptions of their constituencies and identification and fulfillment of their
communities’ needs greatly improves the incumbent’s opportunities of re-nomination and
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electoral success (Downs, 1957; Mayhew, 1974). Briefly, because newcomers and incumbents
seeking reelection must achieve access to the electoral ballot before every election, increasing
inclusiveness and democratization of the nomination process turn aspirants to party tickets eager
to respond to the demands of the enfranchised. 26
In contrast, away from democratic practices, monopolization of the candidate nomination
decisions by the few hinders policy responsiveness. Centralized selection methods imply
substantial levels of participation and command from oligarchic party elites such as national
party leaderships, regional executives, affiliated groups, and faction leaders (Norris, 1996, p.
203). Even if legislative reelection is a de facto alternative, party oligarchies controlling
nomination decisions cause newcomers and incumbents to favor party guidelines over their
constituencies’ interests. Otherwise, incumbents would face the threat of losing party nomination
and newcomers would find themselves in faulty conditions to become serious contenders for
party nomination (Gallagher, 1988b; Hazan, 1999, 2002). Moreover, the candidates’ propensity
to be responsive to the party leadership correlates with their ambition to pursue long-run careers
in the political arena. Politicians will eventually need the support of their political parties in order
to further their careers in either the legislative or the executive branch, at the local, state, or
federal levels of government.
If we acknowledge economic strategy as the fundamental source of economic progress
and policy frameworks as mindful choices, then researchers’ efforts ought to expose the policy-

26

Even though democratization and geographic decentralization of the nomination decisions may be related
phenomena, it is democratic inclusiveness of the intra-party selection process the key to understand the politicians’
incentive to remain political responsive to wide-encompassing interests. It is inclusiveness and massification of the
candidate recruitment process that truly define a democratic process of candidate selection (Hazan, 2002, p. 117). If
nomination decisions are delegated to local party bosses, decentralization of the nomination decisions does not
imply higher levels of intra-party democracy neither the encouragement of policy responsiveness. For instance, the
scholarly literature authenticate the occurrence of elite-centered candidate selection within parties and decentralized
party structures in countries such as Argentina (Jones, 2002; De Luca, Jones, & Tula, 2002), Brazil (Figueiredo &
Limongi, 2000), and Mexico (Story, 1992; Camp, 1993; Lujambio, 1998).
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makers’ motives. The methods employed by political parties to select candidates for general
elections greatly vary across nations and across political parties within nations. However, if the
focal point is the occurrence or absence of a democratic process in the intra-party nomination
methods, categorization of contemporary electoral states by having or not a politically responsive
national assembly suggests an economic difference as well as a difference in the quality of
democracy supplied by the countries’ political systems. In the developed world, candidate
nomination within political parties appears largely informed by inclusive and democratic
practices. In contrast, in the less-developed world events of intraparty participatory politics are
for the most part absent, with nomination decisions often monopolized by national party leaders
and local party bosses. The economic effects as well as the political consequences of candidate
selection are identified as subjects deserving closer scrutiny.
The political economy literature often stresses differences in political institutions in order
to explain policy choices, growth and development. While political scientists have long
recognized the relevance of the methods employed by political parties to select candidates for
general elections, the economic effects of candidate selection have attracted much less
consideration from researchers in the field of political economy. The following section adds to
the scholarly literature by formalizing the connection between the degree of participation and
democratization of the methods employed by political parties to select candidates for general
elections and the adoption of characteristic policy frameworks, then growth and development.
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2.3. The Formal Approach to the Economic Effects of Policy Responsiveness

The literature dealing with the issue of political responsiveness in electoral states
traditionally emphasizes the agency problems implied by the principle of democratic
representation. Voters, the principals, look at elected officials as agents. Limited and asymmetric
information, weak monitoring and incomplete contracts create the potential for opportunistic
behavior from the part of the agents. The existence of principal-agent and asymmetric
information problems may then be conducive to a status of poor democratic representation where
politicians could be adopting positions contrary to those that would be pursued if voters were
fully informed.
Even though the striking implications that the existence of agency problems have on
democratic representation, the orthodox approach treats policy responsiveness as a secondary
outcome of a process in which politicians trade off campaign resources for representation efforts
of narrow interests that regular voters disprove. Incumbents respond to the unpopular demands of
donors provided that the benefits obtained from campaign resources to reach the less informed
voters exceed the loss of electoral support from the informed voters (e.g., Austen-Smith, 1987;
Bailey, 2004; Baron, 1994; Bawn & Thies, 2003; Clawson, Neustadtl, & Weller, 1998; Denzau
& Munger, 1986; Grossman & Helpman, 2001; Prat, 2002).
Moreover, implicit in the literature on money and politics is the assumption that
politicians are benevolent agents whose judgment becomes impaired by the demands of
campaign contributors. This perspective on the role of donors to political campaigns implies that
institutional frameworks preventing any role to money in political campaigns would maximize
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the politicians’ response to the interests of the whole. However, if we admit the role of
institutions as determinants of the politicians’ behavior and policy choices, the lack of incentives
for politicians to act responsive to the narrow interests does not imply higher democratic
responsiveness. Even in the absence of incentives to look after narrow concerns, the incumbents’
equilibrium behavior may not favor the quality of democratic representation.
Furthermore, the literature dealing with the issue of campaign contributions and
democratic representation usually deems reelection as the relevant institutional mechanism for
politicians to act responsive to the demands of the unorganized group of regular voters. It is the
reelection mechanism that also predisposes politicians to skew policy towards those choices
preferred by narrow interests in exchange for campaign contributions and resources that may
help the incumbent to stay in office. Lately, however, the scholarly literature has evolved to
acknowledge the effects that several political institutions have on the politicians’ propensity to
represent the broader interests through the policy-making process. For instance, the process of
running for public office, in general, and that of electing a new legislature, in particular, usually
starts by achieving party nomination. The fact that contenders for public office must achieve
access to the electoral ballot before every election suggests that the intra-party nomination
methods impact the politician’s representation efforts and policy choices once in office. The
following section shall address these issues in greater detail.

2.3.1. A Simple Model of Policy Responsiveness with Candidate Selection

This section formalizes the notion that the incentives provided by the intra-party
candidate nomination methods are crucial in order to understand the politicians’ representation
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efforts, the incumbent’s policy choices and economic outcomes. Expressly, newcomers and
incumbents seeking reelection must first respond to the demands of those with the power to add
their names to the electoral ballot. Consequently, increasing participation and democratization of
the intra-party nomination processes has a positive effect on the incumbent’s propensity to
represent the interests of the whole and adopt policies that favor economic affluence. In contrast,
elite-centered nomination methods decrease the incumbent’s propensity to respond to the
interests of the whole in favor of the representation of narrow interests that often demand
policies that benefit the group at the expense of overall economic growth.
The initial motivation is to assess the sensitiveness of members of national assemblies to
represent wide-encompassing interests through the policy-making process. Special attention is
paid to the distinctive efforts of members of congress. By institutional design, in democratic
regimes the legislators’ choices define, for the most part, actual public policy. Even though the
actual process of policy-making greatly varies across countries (Lijphart, 1984, 1989, 1991,
1999), legislative outcomes largely determine the countries’ economic and social policies. In
today’s democratic world, legislative consent by national assemblies regularly precedes the stage
of governmental action.
The model builds on Denzau and Munger’s (1986) constrained maximization model of
money and politics. The authors model the decision dilemma that U.S. legislators face if seeking
reelection. Rational, self-interested incumbents allocate their representation efforts to both,
organized pressure groups that supply campaign resources and regular voters who supply the
necessary votes to keep the incumbent in office. Denzau and Munger show that the policy
preferences of the growth-oriented regular voters limit the legislator’s willingness to represent
the often growth-retarding demands of interest groups. Incumbents respond to the donors’
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unpopular demands only if the benefits attained from the contributors’ resources to reach the
less-informed voters exceed the loss of electoral support from more-informed voters.

2.3.1.1. The Agents

The legislator’s decision problem is one of effort allocation to represent the demands of
interest groups, EI; the demands of those in the political party with the power to add the
incumbent’s name to the electoral ballot before every election, EP, and the demands of the
unorganized group of voters at the general election, EU. As in Denzau and Munger (1986),
“effort is simply the amount of the legislator's time, the time spent by staff, and the amount of
office resources a legislator allocates to an activity, and Ē is the total amount of effort he has
available to allocate (p. 93).”

2.3.1.2. The Single Legislator’s Problem if Inclusive-Democratic Candidate Selection

Consider the case of an incumbent interested on reelection. Suppose the electoral rule is
such that incumbents must achieve party nomination before every election in a party primary
decided by plurality rule. Assume interest groups only care about EI; regular voters care about
EU and EI ; and party supporters at the party primary care about EP, EU and EI. Explicitly, donors
supply campaign resources, R, to the legislator in exchange for representation efforts of their
narrow concerns. Incumbents may then use campaign resources R to reach the less-informed
voters before the next election. Regular voters at the district election care merely about the
maximum level of welfare available and the actual state of the economy, hence disapprove the
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incumbent’s efforts to represent the demands of interest groups that often extract resources from
the economy and reduce welfare.27 Party supporters, as a subset of the more encompassing group
of regular voters, care about the general state of the economy as well as the incumbent’s stances
on salient issues other than the economy and disprove the incumbent’s representation efforts of
narrow concerns.
Assuming legislators care only about reelection and allocate their efforts to maximize the
votes received at the next election, the single incumbent’s vote share function at the district
election is:

V=VD{(p/ē)EU(EP), EI , R(EI)}

Where

The legislator’s representation efforts to the demands of the district electorate are a
function of his/her efforts to represent the demands of participants at the party primary, EU(EP).
Because the initial step in the process of running for public office is that of achieving party
nomination, participants at the party primary are the gatekeepers in the process of electing a new
27

Much of the economic-voting literature supports the view that the state of economy plays a meaningful role when
electors decide whom to support. Jacobson (1990) show that in the US, economic performance is inversely
correlated to legislative turnover. Kramer (1971), Hibbing and Alford (1981) and Kiewiet (1983) show that electors
deem U.S. representatives of the incumbent government responsible for the state of the economy. Researchers have
also shown that legislative professionalism fails to insulate legislative elections in the U.S. from the effects of the
national economic conditions (Chubb, 1988) and economic shocks (Chubb, 1988; Hibbing, 1999). In addition to the
U.S., evidence of economic voting has been noted in Canada (Johnston, Blais, Brady, & Crête, 1992), France
(Lafay, 1991), Germany (Kirchgässner, 1991; Goergen & Norpoth, 1992; Anderson, 1995) and the U.K. (Studlar,
McAllister, & Ascui, 1990; Norpoth, 1992).
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legislature. Reelection-seekers must first be responsive to the demands of the party gatekeepers
in order to ensure at least a relative majority in the primary election. Alternatively, contenders
ignoring the demands of participants at the party primary, (EP=0), are denied nomination.
Together with the denial of re-nomination, incumbents lose the power to represent the demands
of the district constituency (EU=0). Consequently, incumbents cannot be responsive to the
district electorate without first being responsive to the demands of party supporters at the party
primary.
Moreover, increasing participation and democratization of the nomination process
facilitates the incumbent’s task of effort allocation and representation. Let (p/ē) € (0,1)
characterize the fraction of voters in the district election that participate as well in the party
primary. Considering the number of district voters fixed at least for the next election, (p/ē) can be
regarded as an indirect measure of the ideological distance between the median voter at the
general election and the median voter of the necessarily smaller group of party supporters at the
primary election. As p0, only those party supporters with intense political views are likely to
participate in the party primary. As pē, (p/ē)1 meaning that the primary constituency comes
to resemble the district constituency. To the extent that the primary election is sufficiently
inclusive and decided by democratic means, the incumbent’s representation efforts to the median
party supporter are likely to please the median voter at the district level (Mayhew, 1974).
The incumbent’s problem is to find the optimal allocation of effort that maximizes his/her
chances to stay in office. Formally:

Max V = VD{(p/ē)EU(EP), EI , R(EI)} subject to EP + EU + EI = Ē
EP,EU, EI
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As in Denzau and Munger (1986), the first-order conditions can be rearranged to give the
legislator’s supply price for servicing narrow interests:

The legislator’s supply price is always positive given (p/ē) € (0,1) and ∂VD/∂EI < 0. The
party supporters’ participation rate at the primary election is key in order to understand the
legislator’s representation efforts once in office. The amount of resources needed to persuade an
incumbent to represent narrow concerns is increasing with the level of participation of party
supporters at the primary election. Party supporters at the primary election are just a subset of the
district electorate and increasing efforts to represent the unpopular demands of interest groups
reduces the incumbent’s prospects to win both, the party primary and the district election.
Consider the case in which pē. This implies (p/ē)1 and ∂EU/∂EP1. If party
primaries are sufficiently inclusive and carried out by democratic means, the policy preferences
and political stances of members of the party at the ground will resemble those of the general
electorate (Mayhew, 1974). Clearly, the legislator’s supply price reaches its maximum from the
term

with p = ē, and any decrease in the participation rate at the primary election

reduces the amount of resources needed to convince an incumbent to represent the demands of
interest groups. If p = ē, the legislator looks at party supporters and the group of regular voters as
a single constituency and his/her vote share function becomes that of Denzau and Munger
(1986), V = VD(EU, EI, R(EI)). Consequently, the model of legislative behavior presented in this
section anticipates more representation of narrow concerns from the part of incumbents than that
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predicted by Denzau and Munger (1986) because instances of relatively small participation at primary
elections in comparison to district elections are by far the rule rather than the exception.

Briefly, only contenders prioritizing the demands of party supporters at primary elections
will have their names added to the electoral ballot. If reelection is a political purpose, successful
incumbents must be responsive to the demands of both, supporters at the primary election and
regular voters at the district election. Because participants at the primary election are just a
subset of the more encompassing group of regular voters at the district election, increasing
participation and democratization of the nomination process favors the adoption of growthenhancing policies. This happens because the citizenry looks at the state of the economy in order
to decide whom to support. As a corollary, increasing participation and democratization of the
nomination process increase the amount of resources needed to persuade an incumbent to
represent the often growth-retarding demands of interest groups that regular voters disprove.

2.3.1.3. The Single Legislator’s Problem if Elite-Centered Candidate Selection

Consider the alternative case in which, in the absence of a democratic process,
nomination decisions are monopolized by party leaders. If elite-centered candidate selection,
then party discipline becomes perhaps the legislator’s most valuable political asset in order to
achieve party nomination. Contenders must prioritize the party platform, guidelines and demands
of the party leadership or face the threat of losing party nomination. Consequently, the
legislator’s representation efforts to the demands of regular voters are now conditional to the
demands of the party oligarchy making nomination decisions.
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Formally, nomination decisions on the hands of the few imply p = 0 because party rules
deny party supporters any role in the selection of candidates for legislative contestation. Given
that (p/ē) = 0 and

= 0, the legislator’s supply price becomes:

The fact that contenders to party tickets do not have to please party supporters but
members of the party oligarchy in order to have their names added to the electoral ballot has
important consequences on the incumbents’ representation efforts. First, as noted in the previous
section, if inclusive-democratic candidate selection, the amount of resources needed to persuade
an incumbent to represent narrow interests reaches its maximum when the party primary
constituency resembles the district electorate. Any decrease in the participation rate of party
supporters at the primary election decreases the incumbent’s supply price. Under elite-centered
candidate selection, the legislator’s supply price reaches its minimum implying that the
incumbent’s propensity to represent narrow concerns is now at its maximum. Overtly, elitecentered candidate selection favors the representation of the often growth-retarding demands of
interest groups through the policy-making process:
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Second, elite-centered candidate selection facilitates to interest groups the otherwise
more complicated task of having their demands represented through the policy-making process.
Clearly, nomination decisions on the hands of the few reduce the transaction costs incurred by
interests groups in search for representation efforts. Instead of engaging in the arduous task of
building a coalition of incumbents willing to represent their narrow concerns, special interests
may now negotiate directly with a clearly identifiable small group of part leaders. In exchange
for representation efforts, interest groups may now contribute campaign resources to the party
elite, knowing that incumbents must comply with the demands of the party leadership or face the
threat of losing party nomination at the time of the next election.
Third, nominated candidates still need to win the, perhaps competitive, district election.
However, the incumbent’s capacity to answer to the demands of regular voters is limited by the
legislator’s representation efforts to the party leadership that she/he must prioritize in order to
win party nomination. Under conditions of limited representation capabilities to increase his/her
district’s vote share, campaign contributions grow to be decisive for the incumbent’s political
survival. Even though politicians’ reliance on pork-barrel politics across modern electoral states
is well documented, in countries where nomination decisions are under the control of the
national party or local party bosses the exploits of clientelism and patronage acquire a pervasive
role. For instance, evidence of politicians’ systematic reliance on pork-barrel politics has been
noted by the scholarly literature across a number of countries in Africa (e.g., Bates, 1982;
Bratton & van de Walle, 1994; Wantchekon, 2003) and Latin America (e.g., Ames, 2001;
Benton, 2007; Calvo & Murillo, 2004; Mainwaring, 1999; Martz, 1997).
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One important question must be addressed: If we acknowledge party leaders interested on
electoral success, why don’t be politically responsive to the interests of the electoral constituency
beyond pork-barrel politics? Away from a democratic process and intra-party participatory
politics, nomination decisions monopolized by party leaders turn incumbents exceptionally
receptive to the demands of the party leadership. To all appearances, aside political platforms,
unearthing the policy preferences and demands of party leaders becomes an essential task. A
meaningful analysis, however, must address the institutional conditions in which the actual
policy-making process is carried out if we want to know who gets represented. The next chapter
develops the case and provides supportive evidence that elite-centered candidate selection plays
a major role enabling executives to implement her/his preferred policies. Executive prevalence
then limits the capacity of party leaders in the governing coalition to use policy beyond
clientelism and patronage for electoral gains.
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Elite-Centered Candidate Selection Enables Executives Prevalence:
Evidence from Fiscal Policy in Latin America

“…All in all for a democratic people to lodge powers in an elective executive is a risky
business (p. 174).” Mayhew, D. R. (1974). Congress: The electoral connection. New Haven:
Yale University Press.

Undeniably, sound policy is common knowledge. Despite the politico-institutional
environment and the incentives it may create, political leaders may choose to commit to
strategies that promote economic affluence at any time. However, if we consent to the generally
accepted view of institutions as growth determinants, the lack of incentives for politicians to act
responsive to the interests of the whole may lead to detrimental economic outcomes.
This chapter sets out to investigate the effects that term limits have on the politicians’
policy choices and the role that, in democratic regimes, elite-centered candidate selection play as
a determinant of the politicians’ ability to implement their preferred policies. This chapter’s
thesis is as follows: elite-centered candidate selection plays a meaningful role placing executives
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in an advantageous position to further his/her preferences over policy. This chapter then uses
fiscal policy as the policy of choice to exemplify what the detrimental effects of executive
prevalence and executive term limits are on fiscal outcomes in Latin America. Beyond the
confines of the Latin American region, the approach pursued in this chapter may also provide
partial explanation for the current fiscal distress experienced by Greece, Italy, Spain and
Portugal; all countries where nomination decisions, away from democratic practices, are
monopolized by party leaders.

3.1. Executive Prevalence: Evidence from Fiscal Policy

From an institutional standpoint a variety of motives can drive fiscal outcomes.28
Recently, the literature has evolved to study the politicians’ behavior and their policy choices
according to the reputation building model of politics. In an attempt to study electoral cycles and
fiscal cycles, Rogoff (1990) constructs a model based on a forward looking electorate that
receives signals from politicians that is indicative of their ability to govern. Rogoff’s seminal
work points to the notion that politicians’ incentive to establish a reputation and/or signal
through the use of public policy can have important outcomes. Only those politicians who desire
to run for office must maintain a reputation of political responsiveness and responsible economic
policy among constituents. If establishing a reputation matters for future political purposes, fiscal
policies can be important signals to voters and politicians’ incentive to signal through the use of
28

Scholars have paid close attention to the effects of various political institutions to fiscal discipline. According to
Alesina and Tabellini (1990) public debt is typically used by each government to influence the choices of its
successors. Perrson and Svensson (1989) find that conservatives run fiscal deficits in order to constrain the spending
choices of the elected official, especially if they know a liberal candidate will take office. Federalism is another
factor that may contribute to the successes or failures of macroeconomic stabilization and reform. Treisman (1999)
shows that failure to coordinate economic policy across levels of government leads to fiscal indiscipline and
macroeconomic instability; Wibbels (2001) find evidence that higher subnational spending and deficits lead to larger
deficits at the national level.
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fiscal spending and taxation can have important outcomes. In Rogoff’s view, keeping spending
and tax rates down requires an effort from the part of politicians who pursue these reputationenhancing policies under the prospect of reelection. This happens because future electoral
prospects create an incentive for politicians to build their reputations with this forward looking
electorate who may be judging performance based on these signals. In contrast, increases in
spending and higher tax rates occur during the incumbent’s last term because a good reputation
in these matters will be of no use for the politician’s future political purposes.
Although Rogoff’s (1990) proposition has not been subject of extensive research, the
available empirical studies examining fiscal decisions of chief executives find robust support to
the view that the imposition of term limits in office of executives alters the incumbent’s
behavior. 29 Besley and Case’s (1995) work was the first to test the reputation-building model on
fiscal policy across 48 American states, 1950 to 1986. Taking into consideration the factors that
could possibly weaken the relationship of term limits and fiscal policy, they control for party
loyalty, lack of gubernatorial discretion, and life after governorship. Their results suggest that
these other factors are not “strong enough to rein in governors whose days are numbered (p.
775).” The authors find that gubernatorial term limits increase both total government spending
and tax rates. Gubernatorial lame-duck periods appear associated to increases in total state
spending and receipts in the form of sales, income, corporate, and total taxes, particularly when a
Democrat holds office. Their results also indicate that spending and taxes were lower in the first
term in two term-limit states. Rose (2006) extends Besley and Case’s (1995) study to examine
the effect of fiscal institutions across the American states and found that only in states with strict

29

If testing the effect of term limits on the incumbent’s choice between alternative policies, legislative bodies
constitute a poor laboratory. In a country sample of 68 electoral states only four nations banned legislative reelection
since WWII: Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and the Philippines. Ecuador changed its policy to allow for legislative
reelection in 1996 and the Philippines allows up to three consecutive legislative terms since 1987.
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prohibitions on deficit carry-overs, neither gubernatorial term limits nor the partisan composition
of government appear to significantly affect state government expenditures and revenue.
Having established some empirical validity to the importance of executive term limits on
fiscal spending and taxation across American states, Besley and Case’s (1995) study provide the
groundwork for expanding the study of term limits to other institutional settings. Johnson and
Crain (2004) utilize Besley and Case’s (1995) model to study executive term limits among 48
democracies. The authors find substantial evidence of increasing levels of fiscal spending and tax
revenue in democracies with one term limit rule. Government spending grew systematically in
countries under single-term rule in comparison to two-term limits or no term limits at all. In
addition, countries operating under two-term limits suffered significantly from fiscal volatility
though they do not experience a significant increase in government spending over time. Under
two-term limits rule, executives also spent more and increased taxes during the lame-duck
period.
Although in short supply, the available empirical literature corroborates Rogoff’s (1990)
contention that the imposition of term limits alters the behavior of executives, discouraging
political accountability and policy responsiveness, and precluding the adoption of reputationenhancing policies. This raises important questions of how executives, in particular those in
institutional regimes of division of powers, seem persistently successful in the arduous tasks of
building a coalition, preserving the alliance’s cohesiveness and ostensibly leading the budgetary
process despite a likely environment of multi-party politics and periods of divided government.30

30

Empirical evidence supports the notion of coalition-building executives. Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh (2004)
notice that between 1946 and 1999 coalition governments under presidentialism formed in more than half of the
cases in which official parties did not hold a majority in the legislature.
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3.2. The Problem of Effective Governance

In democratic regimes, executives regularly retain a wide degree of latitude in
implementing policy. Executives often have the ability to introduce legislation in many policy
areas, veto powers, amendatory observations faculties (positive veto) that allows executives to
add provisions to legislation and decree powers. All these institutional faculties, where available,
give substantial control to the executive in the area of fiscal policy. However, effective
governance requires congressional support to pass laws. For an elected government, building and
preserving a coalition are perhaps the most important tasks in order to attain governability and
lead the policy-making process.
In parliamentary regimes, the executive has to accommodate the demands of coalition
members in order to form government and stay in office. The problem of attaining governability
may be particularly challenging in systems of division of powers. In presidential systems,
executives act unhindered by coalition demands in order to stay in office. Independently elected
branches and fixed mandates may hamper cooperation, discourage the formation of coalitions
and increase the likelihood of legislative impasses (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Ricciuti,
2004).
Regardless the political regime, executives habitually bargain with congressional
representatives in order to attain governability. Following Mainwaring (1993), executives
looking for support to their programs rely frequently on patronage to induce coalition formation
and coalition cohesiveness. Bueno de Mezquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003) advance
the Selectorate Theory. The Selectorate Theory maintains that leaders who seek the support of a
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small coalition often favor the use of private rewards that only benefit coalition members. Those
who require the support of a large coalition favor the supply of public goods, rather than private
benefits, in order to reward their supporters. Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh (2004) show that
executives have an incentive to make coalition offers and party leaders to accept these offers
once parties are assumed to care about offices and policies in addition to government founds.
Following the authors, parties and party leaders must care about offices and policies because
parties accrue influence and benefits from the programs and policies carried out by the
government. In support of the notion that government ministries matter for parties and party
leaders in the coalition, Gamson (1961) anticipate that parties forming government should each
get a number of ministries that reflects the share of seats they bring to the coalition (p. 376); a
statement known as Gamson’s Law. In a cross-country cross-section study of parliamentary
governments, 1997-2005, Carroll and Cox (2007) find evidence in support of Gamson’s Law in
governments based on pre-election pacts. The authors also find support in favor of Gamson’s
Law in a sample of Western European governments, 1945-2000. In the Latin American context,
Geddes (1994) tests forty-four presidential terms via the development of Appointment and
Survival Strategy Indices. The author concludes that executives take steps to increase state
capacity using funding as well as appointment strategies and the assistance of the bureaucracy to
gain the support of elite party organizers. Briefly, this strand of the literature underlines the idea
that executives can rely on pork-barrel politics, policy concessions and the resources of the
public administration to gain the support of party leaders, increase state capacity and achieve
governability.
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3.3. A Simple Reciprocity Model of Coalition Bargaining with Executive Prevalence and
Elite-Centered Candidate Selection

This section introduces an alternative view to the process of coalition bargaining and
cohesiveness. Informal reciprocity norms, the threat of ostracism from the governing coalition
and the practice of elite-centered candidate selection facilitate coalition formation and coalition
cohesiveness and put the executive in an advantageous position to further his/her preferred
policies.
The model builds on the work of Borcherding and Filson (2002) who provide formal
conditions under which people who consume in groups use informal reciprocity norms in
preference to a price system. The authors show that informal reciprocity agreements are more
likely to arise in groups where potential partners are sufficiently patient, members of the group
are likely to continue to interact, the time between interactions is short, and the group is small
and homogeneous (p. 239).

3.3.1. The Agents

Consider an elected executive who coalesce with a number of party leaders in the
legislature to form government and/or increase state capacity. The executive has unambiguous
preferences over policy. As per Rogoff (990), elected officials care about their reputations if
running for reelection. Fiscal policy is one important way in which reelection seeking executives
signal their ability to govern to voters. Concerning fiscal policy, we anticipate reelection seeking
executives to further their efforts to keep government spending and tax rates down because a
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good reputation in these matters increases their chances to stay in office. This happens because
voters use both past performance as well as the expectation of future performance of contenders
for office to decide whom to support.
In contrast, executives in their last term have no incentives to pursue reputationenhancing policies since their efforts will not be rewarded with an additional term in office.
Binding term limits, for instance, create fewer incentives for reputation building because the
electoral rule eliminates the capacity of the electorate to reward politicians’ past performance
with reelection (Grofman, 1996; Doron & Harris, 2001). In line with Rogoff’s (1990) reputationbuilding model of political behavior, we presume lame-duck executives to exert less effort to
keep spending and taxes down since a good reputation in these matters will be of no use for the
incumbent’s future political purposes.
Consider now the group of party leaders in the legislature. Party leaders are concerned,
above all, about political survival; hence interested on their parties’ electoral success and
vulnerable to intra-party competition. Party leaders accrue benefits from public funds, ministries,
policy concessions and access to the resources of the public administration that strengthen their
leadership within their parties. At any time, party leaders pursue public funds, legislation and
concessions that give him/her an amount of resources that is at least equivalent to his/her
reservation value; i.e. the minimum amount of resources considered necessary by the party
leader to ensure political survival. Consequently, a rational self-interested party leader concerned
with political survival has an incentive to negotiate his/her coalition membership and accept the
executive’s offer if this offer matches, at least, the party leader’s reservation value.
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3.3.2. The Single Party Leader’s Problem

Consider a scenario in which a group of n party leaders in the legislature and the
executive study the prospect of coalescing to form government. Assuming that all party leaders
are identical, party leader i solves the following utility maximization problem:

Max V(x) - c(x) - T*n
x

where x denotes the executive’s offer to party leader i that the executive extends with the aim to
gain the party leader’s support to the policies of the government in office. Explicitly, x represents
the pooled amount of a composed good of public funds, resources of the public administration,
positions in the bureaucracy, policy concessions and/or government programs. V(x) represents
the benefits in dollars that party leader i accrue from x. Assume V(x) is strictly monotonic
increasing in x. Since x is a composed good, party leader i cares more about the aggregate dollar
benefits accrued from V(x) than the specific combination of the basket, x.31 Alternatively, there
is always a number of different baskets x that yield equal dollar values to the party leader.
Party leaders are concerned about political survival. In democratic regimes, party leaders
work through the uncertainties associated to electoral and intra-party competition. To account for
this, political vulnerability enters the party leader’s decision problem in the form of a cost
function, c(x). Because access to more resources strengthens the leadership position of party
The reader may consider a variation of the class of additively separable preferences V(x) = Σn un(xn). An
additively separable utility function on all commodities allows focusing on a group of commodities. This variant,
however, complicates the analysis and does not add much to the point of executives tailoring baskets to the needs of
individual party leaders in order to induce coalition formation and coalition cohesiveness.
31
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leader i within his/her party as well as the party’s electoral prospects, c(x) is decreasing and
unbound in x. Hence, party leader i’s efforts will be directed to capture as much resources as
possible through the coalition bargaining process, even above the party leader’s reservation
value, x .
Transaction costs (T) enter in the form of bargaining costs for party leader i to negotiate
with the executive and other members in the coalition concessions and resources. The intra-party
candidate nomination methods may then have a substantial impact on coalition bargaining costs.
Specifically, away from democratic practices, nomination decisions monopolized by oligarchic
party elites reduce negotiation costs as well as strengthen the party leader’s position as an
effective negotiator. In regard to candidate selection, researchers have long placed the locus of
political authority and control within political parties on the hands of those making nomination
decisions. Following Norris (1996) and Hazan (2002), if elite-centered candidate selection, then
contenders for party nomination must adhere to the directives of the party leadership. Otherwise,
newcomers would find themselves in faulty conditions to achieve party nomination and
incumbents would face the potential denial of re-nomination.32 Overtly, intra-party nomination
decisions on the hands of the few reduce coalition bargaining costs by two means. They remove
the need for the executive and party leaders to negotiate with members of the legislature on an
individual basis. Elite-centered candidate selection also enables party leaders as effective
negotiators with the strength to enforce coalition agreements in the legislature.

32

Elite-centered nomination methods are common across electoral states in Africa. In Latin America, national party
leaders, regional party bosses, or leaders of intraparty factions monopolize, on a regular basis, candidate selection
decisions for legislative elections (Jones & Hwang, 2005, p. 267). For a more detailed examination of the methods
employed by political parties in Latin America to select candidates for general elections see Mainwaring and Scully
(1995), Morgenstern and Nacif (2002) and Siavelis and Morgenstern (2008). Weiner (1967, pp. 48-49) and Chaube
(2003, p. 212) develop a similar case in order to explain the high levels of party discipline observed by MP’s in the
Indian congress. In Southern Europe, researchers have noticed elite-centered candidate selection across parties in
government in Greece (Gallagher, 1988a; Kohler, 1982), Italy (Bardi & Morlino, 1994; Wertman, 1988), Portugal
(Colomer, 1996) and Spain (Colomer, 1996; Lundell, 2004).
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Unlike party leaders in the legislature, chief executives are interested in the composition
of the basket of resources x. In line with Rogoff (1990), politicians interested on reelection have
an incentive to build a reputation of political responsiveness and responsible economic policy
with an electorate that looks at these signals in order to decide whom to support at the time of the
next election. Fiscal policy is one important way in which chief executives signal their ability to
govern. In order to keep spending and taxes down, a reputation-building executive offers to party
leader i a basket x that relies primarily on policy concessions, ministries and/or access to the
resources of the public administration, instead of merely public funds. Formally, if running for
reelection, political vulnerability enters the executive’s decision problem in the form of a
quadratic cost function c(x) initially decreasing in the fiscal component of x, but eventually
increasing in the amount of public funds supplied to party leaders as the executive’s national
electorate starts to perceive deteriorating macro-indicators.
In contrast, executives in their last term reduce their efforts to keep spending and taxes
down since a good reputation in these matters will be of no use for future electoral purposes.
Even though in their last term, executives may still be interested on achieving conditions for
effective governability. Because increasing resources increase the likelihood of a stable coalition,
political vulnerability enters the executive’s decision problem in the form of a cost function, c(x);
where c(x) is decreasing and unbound in x. Notice that, political vulnerability is decreasing in the
amount of resources x for both the lame-duck executive and party leaders in the legislature. To
the extent that increasing resources strengthens the leadership position of all members in the
governing coalition, a spending bias and fiscal imbalances emerge.
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Consequently, the executive’s institutional control over most of the potential components
of x transforms the task of coalition building and coalition cohesiveness into one of public
resources allocation. The executive’s optimal offer of x, x’, must satisfy the following first-order
condition:

V '  x '  c ' ( x ' )  0

where V’(x) represents the first derivative of V(x) with respect to x and c’(x) represents the first
derivative of c(x) with respect to x. Coalition cohesiveness is guarantee if the executive’s offer
matches at least the party leader’s reservation value: x’  x .
Moreover, party leaders in the coalition are expected to participate in a substantial, yet
unknown, number of coalition meetings. The party leader i’s discounted stream of payoffs from
belonging to and remaining in the governing coalition, Wc, is:

Wc  V x'  c( x' )  T * (n  1) 


1 

[V ( x' )  c( x' )  T * (n  1)]

where δ is an exogenous discount factor bounded between 0 and 1. As in Borcherding and Filson
(2002), the discount factor represents a combination of several factors. First, δ reflects the party
leader’s patience. More patient leaders have higher discount factors as they discount future
payoffs at lower rates: δ=1/(1+r), where r is the discount rate. Second, δ reflects the leaders’
shared belief about the likelihood of having a meeting in the near future. The higher the
likelihood of future interactions between the members of a coalition, the higher is the discount
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factor. Third, δ reflects the time between meetings. The shorter the time between meetings, the
higher is the discount factor (p. 241).
In an informal reciprocity agreement, party leader i may deceive his/her coalition
membership. For simplicity, consider the case in which an individual party leader abandons the
coalition in the first meeting. Party leader i’s net present value from defection is:

V x' '  c( x' ' )  T * (n  1)

For a coalition to endure, the prospect of ostracism from the coalition must be a credible
threat. That is, party leader i’s payoff from remaining in the coalition, Wc, must be at least as
large as the payoff associated with the party leader i deceiving his/her coalition membership:

Wc  V x' '  c( x' ' )  T * (n  1)

The above condition is more likely to be satisfied when x’ is larger than x’’, δ is high and
n is small. Alternatively, informal reciprocity agreements sustaining government coalitions are
likely to occur when bargaining costs, the members’ patience, and the probability of meeting
again rise, and as the time between meetings and the number of members in the coalition fall.

3.4. Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Outcomes in Latin America

The Latin America debt crisis of the 1980s provoked concerns regarding how to ensure
economic progress in the region. The development strategies of the 1960s and 1970s,
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emphasizing heavy government involvement, were no longer seen as the solution to
underdevelopment. Instead, these strategies became the culprit for massive government debts,
high rates of inflation, distorted economic incentives and decreasing entrepreneurship
(Dornbusch & Edwards, 1991; Gilpin, 2001).
While broad agreement centered on freer markets and trade liberalization, one of the most
emphasized remedies of structural adjustment was the reduced role of the state in the economy.
For reformers, fiscal discipline was a primary target. During the 1990s, the case for fiscal
restraint became stronger as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico went into crisis. Consequently,
governments across the region initiated several reforms to combat the growth of federal and state
deficits. While Brazil’s federal government established a fiscal responsibility law and debt
restructuring agreements with sub-national public administrations, Peru’s Fiscal Responsibility
and Transparency Law aimed to reduce the deficit of the combined public sector.
Notwithstanding the reform efforts to curtail spending, Latin American countries
routinely live with large deficits. The debt structure of countries throughout the region does not
improve, with budget deficits actually worsening during the latter half of the 1990s and early
2000s and public debt averaging 44% of GDP (Clements, Faircloth, & Verhoeven, 2007).
Moreover, a number of studies identifies the fiscal instability seen in Latin America as one of the
main determinants for the stop-go growth experience in the region. Fiscal volatility impacts
growth patterns because it signals a lack of consistency and predictability in policy, which
hinders investment in productivity-enhancing areas. Between the years 1960-2000, fiscal
volatility in Latin America was higher than in other regions and is closely associated with lower
growth performance (Hausmann & Gavin, 1996; Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti, & Talvi, 1996).
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Despite the emphasis put on fiscal responsibility, why do public spending and budget
imbalances appear persistently increasing across countries in the Latin American region?

3.4.1. The Empirics: Model Specification and Variable Definitions

This section connects Latin American political institutions to fiscal policy outcomes by
investigating the impact of presidential term limits on government expenditure and aggregate
revenue. The study uses panel data from 17 Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The data samples cover
the period 1970-2004. Several nations across the Latin American region were characterized as
authoritarian during the 1970s and early 1980s. Countries that underwent a change of regime
during the period of study do not enter the sample unless they classify at least as electoral states.
The model specification is an extended version of that of Johnson and Crain’s (2004)
which examines the effect of executive term limits on fiscal outcomes in 48 democracies, 19721990: 33

Pct = αTct + βLct + γZct + εct

where c and t are country and time identifiers. The dependent variables are aggregate
government expenditure and aggregate tax revenue as shares of GDP in constant dollars. The

33

In line with Rogoff (1990), Johnson and Crain (2004) find countries with one-term limit connected to increases in
public spending and tax revenue, while countries with two-term limits also experience fiscal volatility.
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main variable of interest is T, a dichotomous variable for whether the executive is in his/her last
term in office. T equals one (1) if the executive is in the lame-duck period and zero otherwise.
The model specification extends that of Johnson and Crain (2004) to include controls for
coalition and congress fragmentation. The main variable of interest is no more than a dummy
indicator for whether executives are in their last term. Conceptually, changes in public spending
and government revenue may come from policies sanctioned by the legislature. Within this line
of thought, much scholarly work examines the “weak government hypothesis:” the idea that the
more fragmented a government, the higher the public spending, deficits, and debt, and the lower
the chances for tax increases. In his seminal 1959 work, Gordon Tullock thinks of fiscal policy
making in democratic regimes as an example of the Tragedy of the Commons. If the political and
pecuniary costs incurred per additional unit of public spending is evenly distributed among all
budget claimants, a spending bias would emerge because individual claimants cannot be held
entirely responsible for the problems associated to a deteriorating budget.34 Researchers test this
hypothesis and find, by the greater part, supportive evidence of a Tragedy of the Commons
problem in fiscal policy; e.g., Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006); Persson, Roland, and Tabellini
(2007).35 In the Latin American context, Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti (1999) find that electoral
formulas of proportional representation in large multi-member districts deteriorate budget
outcomes because the electoral rule increases the likelihood of more fragmented legislatures and
coalition governments. In the model specification, L represents a vector of control variables for
34

Velasco (2000) formalizes Tullock’s discernment in a setting in which the government’s net income is a “common
property” out of which influential interest groups extract resources to finance expenditures on their preferred items.
To the extent in which the benefits from spending accrue to each group, while the costs are spread over all
claimants, a spending bias emerges: transfers are higher than a benevolent planner would choose them to be, fiscal
deficits emerge regardless the countercyclical purpose of fiscal policy, and in the long run, government debt tends to
be excessively high (pp. 108-109).
35

A number of empirical studies actually dismisses the existence of a Tragedy of the Commons problem in fiscal
policy; e.g., Cheibub (2006), Hahm, Kamlet, and Mowery (1996), Sakamoto (2001), Steinmo and Tolbert (1998)
and Volkerink and de Haan (2001).
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coalition fragmentation and total membership of the parties in government that I include to
examine the “weak government” hypothesis. I use the probability that two deputies picked at
random from among the parties in government will be of different parties (GOVFRAC) as a
proxy for coalition fragmentation. The proxies for total membership within the parties in
government are the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in government (HERFGOV) and
the fraction of seats held by all government parties with respect to the total number of seats in the
legislature (MAJ).

Table 3. Data sources
Government expenditures / GDP
Tax revenues / GDP

Income per capita
Population
Population density
Inflation
Trade openess
Gastil index

Executive term limits
Coalition fragmentation and membership

Penn World Tables 6.2.
DataGov-Governance Indicators Database.
Inter-American Development Bank. Available
at http://www.iadb.org/datagob/
Penn World Tables 6.2.
Penn World Tables 6.2.
Penn World Tables 6.2.
IMF World Economic Outlook.
Penn World Tables 6.2.
Polity IV Project: Political Regime
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002. M.
G. Marshall & K. Jaggers. Center for
International Development and Conflict
Management. University of Maryland, College
Park. Available at
www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/
Stateman’s Yearbook.
2004 Database of Political Institutions. P.
Keefer. Development Research Group. The
World Bank.

Z represents a vector of economic, demographic, and institutional control variables that
have been shown determinants of fiscal policy. Control variables include real income per capita,
population, population density, average rate of inflation, and Sachs measure of trade openness.
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According to Wagner’s law, the demand for government services is income elastic and is
expected to rise with higher levels of income. I use the seven-point Gastil Index of Political
Rights to control for the effect of democratic government on fiscal policy. Democratic
governments, rather than authoritarian regimes, have an eminent tendency to respond to popular
pressures which should affect fiscal spending and tax rates. I add controls for the initial levels of
government spending and revenue in order to account for differences among the nations’ levels
of public welfare.

Table 4. Summary statistics
Countries
All
Government expenditures
Tax revenues
Income per capita
Population
Population density
Average inflation (%)
Trade openess
Gastil index
GOVFRAC
HERFGOV
MAJ

One-term limit rule Two-term limit rule

18.6074
(4.93)
14.6613
(4.61)
4707.5110
(2478.90)
25825.55
(38923.84)
53.2982
(64.65)
15.3601
(8.48)
43.3353
(22.06)
2.69
(1.29)
0.1800
(0.27)
0.8226
(0.26)
0.5780
(0.18)

77

19.4845
(5.86)
14.3540
(3.69)
4581.50
(2193.91)
31394.23
(41716.87)
65.3058
(73.66)
16.8775
(8.05)
45.2208
(21.60)
2.7317
(1.12)
0.1859
(0.27)
0.8175
(0.27)
0.5639
(0.18)

19.6958
(3.64)
13.6807
(1.16)
6187.33
(2942.42)
59109.99
(61122.51)
22.6711
(11.08)
8.5130
(10.01)
31.1543
(12.22)
3.5652
(1.50)
0.4035
(0.34)
0.5996
(0.34)
0.6275
(0.22)
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3.4.2. Government Expenditures and Tax Revenues

Table 5 (below) reports the results for the effect of executive term limits on aggregate
public expenditures as a share of GDP. I first replicate Johnson and Crain (2004) formulation to
investigate the effect of executive term limits on government spending. In Model (1), left- and
right-hand side data enter without transformations. Model (2) replicates Model (1) specification
except that left- and right-hand variables enter the model as natural logarithms. The results
indicate that government spending during executive lame-duck terms increases by 16% in
comparison to those periods in which presidents are up for re-election.

Table 5. Government expenditures and executive term limits
17 Latin American electoral states, 1970-2004
Dependent Variable:
Model Specification:
Executive Lame-Duck
Income Per Capita
Population Growth
Population Density
Average Inflation
Trade Openess
Gastil Index
Gov. Expenditure 1970

(1) Government
(2) Government
(3) Government
(4) Government
(5) Government
Expenditures / GDP Expenditures / GDP Expenditures / GDP Expenditures / GDP Expenditures / GDP
(double-log)
(double-log)
(double-log)
(double-log)
OLS regressions, correlated panels corrected standard errors.
2.1403***
(0.34)
0.0001***
(0.00)
0.0000***
(0.00)
0.0034
(0.00)
0.0008***
(0.00)
-0.0221***
(0.01)
-0.1262
(0.10)
0.5976***
(0.06)

0.1493***
(0.01)
0.0435***
(0.02)
-0.0488***
(01)
-0.0072
(0.01)
0.0269***
(0.01)
-0.0422***
(0.01)
-0.0060
(0.01)
0.5382***
(0.04)

0.1332***
(0.02)
0.0477***
(0.02)
-0.0410***
(0.01)
0.0024
(0.01)
0.0293***
(0.01)
-0.0386***
(0.01)
-0.0110*
(0.01)
0.5131***
(0.04)
0.0399
(0.03)

GOVFRAC
HERFGOV

0.1333***
(0.02)
0.0477***
(0.02)
-0.0410***
(0.01)
0.0024
(0.01)
0.0293***
(0.01)
-0.0386***
(0.01)
-0.0109*
(0.01)
0.5132***
(0.04)

0.1594***
(0.02)
0.0491***
(0.02)
-0.0521***
(0.01)
-0.0040
(0.01)
0.0251***
(0.01)
-0.0530***
(0.01)
-0.0076
(0.01)
0.5317***
(0.04)

-0.0406
(0.03)

MAJ
R2
0.4454
0.5037
0.5137
0.5138
Prob > X2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Observations
419
414
395
395
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 90% confidence level, ** significant at 95% confidence level, *** significant at 99% confidence level.
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(0.06)
0.5073
0.0
395
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Models (3) to (5) in Table 5 extend Model (2) to include the controls for coalition
fragmentation (GOVFRAC) and coalition membership (HERFGOV, MAJ). Coalition
fragmentation and total membership of the parties in government appear to have a positive
impact on government spending although this connection shows below the 90% level of
confidence. Variations in coalition fragmentation and coalition membership do not have a major
statistical impact on aggregate government expenditures despite the fact that electoral rules of
proportional representation are likely to back congressional politics. These results diverge in part
from those in the literature finding unequivocal evidence of a Tragedy of the Commons problem
in fiscal policy across countries in the Latin American region (Stein et al., 1999).
Briefly, throughout Table 5 there is a positive connection above the 99% level of
confidence between the indicator variable for executives in the lame-duck period (T) and the size
of the budget as a share of GDP. This connection remains robust to changes in model
specification and robust to the inclusion of controls for coalition fragmentation and overall
coalition membership. In line with Rogoff (1990), Latin American presidents in their last term
reduce their efforts to keep spending down.
Table 6 (below) reports the results for the effect of executive term limits on tax revenue
as a share of GDP. I first replicate the methodology used to study government expenditures
running a series of random-effects GLS regressions. Throughout Table 6, the control indicator
for executives in the lame-duck period (T) appears persistently associated to decreases in tax
revenue although this association remains below the 90% level of confidence.36

36

As a robustness check, I replicate the study using aggregate government revenue as a share of GDP as dependent
variable. Reliable time series of aggregate government revenue for Latin American countries are rather scarce. I use
panel data 1990-2004 from the IMF International Financial Statistics and Government Finance Statistics to run a
series of random-effects GLS regressions. Allowing for some variations in the details, results stay consistent with
those from the main study.
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Against Rogoff’s (1990) contention, Latin American executives seem not to reduce their
efforts to keep taxes down during their last term in office. A plausible explanation may be found
in the chief executives’ prospects for future employment. In a prisoner-dilemma-alike theoretical
framework, Cohen and Spitzer (1996) show that term limits make politicians prone to service
private interests. Because no higher position in the public administration is available for chief
executives after their last term, potential after-term employment may likely come from
businesses and industries that deal directly with the government. In line with Cohen and Spitzer,
I presume executives to care about private interests because political responsiveness toward
influential interest groups increases their chances of subsequent employment.

Table 6. Tax revenues and executive term limits
17 Latin American electoral states, 1970-2004
Dependent Variable:
Model Specification:
Executive Lame-Duck
Income Per Capita
Population Growth
Population Density
Average Inflation
Trade Openess
Gastil Index
Gov. Revenue 1970

(1) Tax Revenues
/ GDP

(2) Tax Revenues
/ GDP
(double-log)

(3) Tax Revenues
/ GDP
(double-log)

(4) Tax Revenues
/ GDP
(double-log)

(5) Tax Revenues
/ GDP
(double-log)

-0.0695
(0.06)
0.6100***
(0.20)
-0.1725*
(0.10)
-0.1605
(0.12)
-0.0741***
(0.02)
0.0536
(0.12)
-0.0003
(0.01)
0.3293*
(0.18)
0.0681
(0.05)

-0.0695
(0.06)
0.6097***
(0.20)
-0.1724*
(0.10)
-0.1603
(0.20)
-0.0742***
(0.02)
0.0538
(0.12)
-0.0003
(0.01)
0.3293*
(0.18)

-0.0721
(0.05)
0.5630***
(0.20)
-0.1462
(0.09)
-0.1513
(0.12)
-0.0776***
(0.02)
0.0824
(0.11)
-0.0027
(0.01)
0.3340**
(0.17)

Random-effects GLS regressions.
-1.6413**
(68)
0.0010***
(0.00)
0.0000
(0.00)
0.0047
(0.01)
-0.0003*
(0.00)
0.0026
(0.02)
-0.0871
(0.15)
0.1006
(0.22)

-0.0576
(0.05)
0.5752***
(0.19)
-0.1474
(0.09)
-0.1601
(0.11)
-0.0763***
(0.02)
0.1205
(0.11)
0.0002
(0.01)
0.3227**
(0.16)

GOVFRAC
HERFGOV

-0.0685
(0.05)

MAJ
R2
0.2448
0.3167
0.3462
0.3463
Prob > X2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Observations
274
273
263
263
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 90% confidence level, ** significant at 95% confidence level, *** significant at 99% confidence level.
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Model (3) in Table 6 introduces the control for coalition fragmentation. Higher coalition
fragmentation seems to positively impact tax revenue, although this association shows below the
90% level of confidence. In Models (4) and (5) in Table 6, I introduce the controls for total
membership of all parties in government on an individual basis. In both cases, the variable
indicators for overall coalition membership fall short of statistical significance as well.
The results on the control variables appear as expected. Income per capita and population
appear associated to increases in government spending and tax revenue as shares of GDP. In
Latin America, like in Western Europe, trade openness seems to go along with fiscal restraint as
part of the neoliberal reform packages. The Gastil Index of Political Rights appears negatively
associated to government spending and tax revenue. This finding contradicts the conventional
wisdom that more democratic institutions favor spending and preclude tax increases, even under
governments with conservative ideology. The controls for the initial levels of government
spending and tax revenue show positively associated and statistically significant above the 90%
level of confidence.
In sum, even though executive term limits in Latin America affect spending behavior in
the same manner as they do in U.S. states and other democracies, Latin American presidents
seem not to reduce their efforts to keep taxes down during their last term. Coalition
fragmentation appears to play at best a marginal role at explaining aggregate spending and
aggregate tax revenue. Different from Johnson and Crain (2004) who find that tax revenues
increase during an incumbent’s binding term, in Latin America tax revenues decrease, suggesting
that spending practices have an even more disastrous effect by creating fiscal deficits.
Considering that revenues may be lower either because of less general effort or because
politicians’ grant tax breaks just before elections for the same reasons that they spend more, the
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trend is that incumbent’s policies in their binding term are serving short-term benefits to some at
the expense of longer-term costs to everyone. These findings have disturbing consequences for
the region since revenues are not complementing spending, and the fiscal state of each country is
left in disequilibrium. In the next section, I discuss the recent presidential term limit changes and
examine the varying impact that these institutional differences have on fiscal outcomes.

3.4.3. One-Term vs. Two-Term Limits

Between 1970 and 2004, most Latin American presidents were institutionally constrained
to run for reelection. In the last 15 years, several Latin American countries have initiated
constitutional changes to presidential term limits. Executive term limit rules have changed in six
Latin American countries. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru and Venezuela have
had constitutional reforms that changed presidential term limits from a one-term rule to a twoterm limit rule. Argentina was the first to change the term limit rule. A 1994 constitutional
reform reduced the presidential term to four years and limited the president and vice president to
two consecutive terms. Presidents are now allowed to stand for a third term or more after an
interval of at least one term. In 1995, Peru adopted the two-term limit rule for the executive.
After one interim term, former presidents may be reelected. A 1996 law allowed President
Alberto Fujimori to run for a third term, but this was due to the fact that his first term began prior
to the 1995 constitutional amendments. In Brazil, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso
proposed to amend the Constitution in order to be re-elected. By 1997 the Brazilian Congress
voted for the re-election amendment in the constitution, and Cardoso became the first Brazilian
president to be re-elected for a second term. In Venezuela, as Hugo Chavez took power in 1999,
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various constitutional changes took place, including one allowing the president to run for two
consecutive terms and the passage of a 2009 amendment that allows the president to run for
reelection indefinitely. In Costa Rica, a constitutional ban for incumbents to run for re-election
was overturned in 2004. An incumbent, however, has to await an inter-term period before
running again for office. In Colombia, President Alvaro Uribe sought a constitutional
amendment during his first term that allowed him to run for office again. Uribe was re-elected in
the 2006 presidential race.
These changes in term limits in several Latin American offer a unique opportunity to test
the for the effects of alternative presidential term limit rules on fiscal responsibility. The
implications from the reputation building model of politics establishes that two-term limits create
different incentives than binding term limits, making politicians act differently under these two
institutional environments (Besley & Case, 1995; Johnson & Crain, 2004).
I test for the difference on fiscal outcomes between executive lame-duck periods in
countries under single-term vs. two-term limits rule. For the case of government spending, I use
separate dummy variables for the one-term and two-term limit countries and run a series of OLS
regressions correlated panels corrected standard errors for the period 1970-2004. Table 7 (below)
reports the results. Throughout Table 7, left- and right-hand side variables enter as natural
logarithms. Model (1) shows the case in which we add separate dummy variables for the oneterm and two-term limit countries. The results resemble those of Johnson and Crain (2004) who
found robust evidence of lame-duck executives under single-term limit rule spending more on
average than those in countries under two term-limit rule. The coefficient of the one-term limit
country is positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. The coefficient on
the lame duck indicator in two-term limit countries is positive and statistically significant at the
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99% confidence level as well. Spending as a share of GDP increases 2% more during the lame
duck of one-term limit presidents compared to the lame duck term of two-term limit presidents.
However, controlling for executive lame-duck periods under one- and two-term limits rule does
not improve significantly the R2 (0.5054) in comparison to our results when we do not control
for the alternative rules (0.5037).
In order to study the problem of the commons in government spending, Models (2) to (4)
in Table 7 introduce the controls for coalition fragmentation (GOVFRAC) and total membership
of the parties in government (HERFGOV, MAJ) for the case in which the executive is always in
his/her last term. Models (5) to (7) in Table 7 introduce the controls for coalition fragmentation
for the case in which the executive is in the lame-duck period under two-term limit rule. By
means of controlling for the alternative term-limit rules, the results diverge from those in which
executives are in their final period regardless the term-limit rule. Throughout Table 7, there is
evidence of an increasing role of party politics on government spending decisions, in particular
during the lame-duck period of executives under two-term limit rule. In this case, higher
coalition fragmentation appears associated to increases in spending above the 99% level of
confidence. Increases in total membership of the parties in government show a robust connection
to increases in government spending above the 99% level of confidence as well.
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I examine the effect of the alternative executive term-limits rules and the problem of the
commons on tax revenues. I replicate the methodology used to study government spending
except that I run a series of random-effects GLS regressions, 1970-2004. Table 8 (below) reports
the results.
Model (1) in Table 8 shows the results for the case in which I add separate dummy
variables for the executive one-term and two-term limit countries. The results for the Latin
American region differ from those of Johnson and Crain (2004) who found a positive connection
between government revenue and their variable indicators for the alternative executive term-limit
rules. In Model (1), the coefficient of the one-term limit country is negative and below the 90%
level of confidence. The coefficient of the lame duck indicator in two-term limit countries is
positive and statistically insignificant. Moreover, controlling for executive lame-duck periods
under one- and two-term limits rules does not improve the value of the R2 (0.3167) in
comparison to the case where there is no control for the alternative rules (0.3151).
Models (2) to (4) in Table 8 introduce the controls for coalition fragmentation
(GOVFRAC) and total membership of the parties in government (HERFGOV, MAJ) for the case
in which a single term-limit rule constrains the executive to run for reelection. In all three
models, the coefficient indicator for lame-duck executives shows negative and statistically
insignificant below the 90% level of confidence. Models (5) to (7) in Table 8 introduce the
controls for coalition fragmentation and total membership of the parties in government for the
case in which the executive is in the lame-duck period under two-term limit rule.
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In Models (5) to (7) in Table 8 (above), the coefficient indicator for lame-duck executives
shows positive and statistically insignificant. Latin American presidents under single term-limits
rule do not reduce their efforts to keep taxes down. In contrast, lame-duck chief executives under
two-term limits rule appear to care less about their reputations in this matter. Higher coalition
fragmentation appears to have a positive effect on taxation decisions regardless the executive
term-limits rule. However, this association remains short of statistical significance below the
90% level of confidence. Overall, the results support the view that institutional differences in
executive term-limits rules do impact fiscal performance.
Summarizing, while mixed evidence supports alternative theories explaining fiscal
outcomes, and the empirical approach in this section dismisses the existence of a Tragedy of the
Commons problem in fiscal policy, it is evident that the results raise the prospect that Latin
American presidents may actually prevail on fiscal policy. I measure presidential term limits’
effects on fiscal spending and aggregate revenue. Results indicate a positive and robust
connection between executive lame-duck periods and increases in government spending.
Executive term limits, however, appear not to have a significant impact on tax revenue. Party
fragmentation within the government coalition and total membership of the parties in
government appear to play only a marginal role at explaining aggregate spending and taxation
outcomes.
To conclude, the above findings have alarming consequences for the region since
revenues may not be complementing spending, and the fiscal state of each country may be left in
disequilibrium. Indeed, the results suggest that the lack of incentives for fiscal discipline creates
the conditions wherein economic mishaps are fostered. This chapter then complements recent
scholarship on budgetary outcomes which illustrates the negative impact that powerful presidents
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have upon budgetary outcomes. In Colombia, for instance, budget deficits have worsened since
the increased concentration of power in the executive branch (Cardenas, Mejia, & Olivera,
2007). In Peru, a powerful president at the expense of a weak Congress has led to opportunistic
behavior in the executive branch (Valderrama, Carranza, & Chávez, 2007).
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“I wish to assert a much more fundamental role for institutions in societies; they are the
underlying determinant of the long-run performance of economies (p. 107).” North, D. (1990).
Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. New York: Cambridge University
Press.

Efforts in the scholarly literature to identify the economic sources of growth and
prosperity are plenty. Not so abundant, however, studies examining the conditions under which
governments in general, and public officials in particular, are likely to pursue sound policies.
This dissertation adds to the political economy literature by introducing the intra-party candidate
nomination methods as an essential institutional aspect that must be taken into account if we
want to understand the politicians’ representation efforts and policy choices. Because the initial
step in the process of running for public office is that of achieving party nomination before every
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election, incumbents interested on reelection must first be responsive to the demands of the party
gatekeepers with the power to add the politician’s name to the electoral ballot.
While political scientists have long recognized the relevance of the methods employed by
political parties to select candidates for general elections, the economic effects of candidate
selection have attracted much less consideration from researchers in the field of political
economy. Using a simple constrained maximization model, I show that, if running for reelection,
increasing participation and democratization of the candidate selection methods increases the
incumbent’s induced propensity to represent the interests of regular voters that habitually value
economic affluence. Quite the opposite, away from a democratic process, party nomination
decisions on the hands of the few increase the incumbent’s responsiveness to the often growthretarding demands of narrow concerns.37 Accordingly, the political parties’ choice of methods to
nominate candidates for electoral contestation may have important economic consequences. In
support to this view, a simple cross-country inspection of the intra-party candidate nomination
methods reveals an empirical regularity: In the developed world intra-party nomination decisions
appear largely informed by inclusive and democratic practices; in the less-developed world
events of intraparty participatory politics are for the most part absent, with nomination decisions
often monopolized by national party leaders and local party bosses.
Consequently, this dissertation adds to the literature finding institutions a precursor of
economic affluence and prosperity (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; North & Thomas, 1970, 1973;
North, 1981, 1990; Knack & Keefer, 1995; Hall & Jones, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson &
Robisnson, 2001, 2002; Easterly & Levine, 2003; Dollar & Kraay, 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian &

37

Indeed, in democratic regimes, regularly scheduled elections and rotation in office may not be enough to deter
politicians from representing the often growth-retarding demands of special interests.
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Trebbi, 2004).38 The alternative view sees institutional development as an eventual outcome of a
process that may begin with a, perhaps autocratic, pro-growth ruler adopting policies conducive
to physical and human capital accumulation, increased education and wealth that eventually lead
to institutional improvement and democratic governance (Lipset, 1960; Barro, 1999; Przeworski,
Alvarez, Cheibub & Limongi, 2000; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2003;
Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2004). Instead, this dissertation advances the
idea that in democratic regimes where the institutional structure, in general, and candidate
selection, in particular, induce the polity to represent the interests of the whole, prosperity will
follow.
Much is left to be done. If we consent to the idea that the economic consequences of the
parties’ choice of method to nominate candidates may be substantial, understanding the motives
behind these choices becomes crucial. Historically, sustained economic growth, particularly in
per capita terms, first occurred in England some time in the latter part of seventeenth century.
Even though incipient by modern standards, the development of private property was well under
way. In addition, a patent system and laws protecting intellectual rights, and a functioning legal
system of common law with the power to enforce contracts made possible that factors of
production, including land and labor, received their pecuniary values. Prices, rewards and
subsidies were also used, for the most part, to encourage innovation and productivity growth
(North & Thomas, 1970, p. 16). The specific conditions that motivated the English Crown and
members of Parliament to create an institutional structure that encouraged economic affluence by
the end of the 1600’s are all subject of further research.

38

This line of research can actually be traced back to Montesquieu (1748) and Smith (1776) who made a case of a
limited government as a growth promoting institution.
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In Olson’s (1982) view, the advancement of civil and political rights require the polity to
pursue policies that benefit the whole. The effects of alternative candidate nomination methods
might prove crucial in order to understand the induced propensity of politicians to advance
policies that improve the quality of democracy. Interestingly, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal,
all countries in which nomination decisions are on the hands of oligarchic party elites, are
consistently ranked below their counterparts in Western Europe by the 7‐point scale Gastil index
(www.Freedomhouse.org) used by the Freedom House to measure political rights and civil
liberties on a yearly basis.
Sound policy is common knowledge. Yet, we have witnessed the failure of many
governments over the world to adopt and maintain over time policy frameworks that promote
economic affluence. If we acknowledge economic strategy as the fundamental source of
economic progress and policy frameworks as mindful choices, then researchers’ efforts ought to
expose the policy-makers’ motives. Ever since Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004)
demonstrated the prevalence of political institution as a growth determinant, the political
economy literature has often stressed differences in political institutions in order to explain
policy variations, then growth and development. This dissertation explored the detrimental
effects that political institutions such as term limits and centralized candidate selection have on
the politicians’ policy choices and economic outcomes. Within the same line of thought, in the
US, Colorado and Oklahoma followed California’s political path by voting in 1992 to impose
term limits on their state legislatures. As of today, more than twenty states in the US incorporate
some type of term limits on their respective assemblies. The national debate over term limit
legislation started back in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s under the premises that there was a
perceived lack of responsiveness and accountability from the state legislators. Opponents of term
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limits believed exactly the opposite and viewed imposition of term limits as a tool for reducing
legislator’s motivation and responsiveness to the public. Clearly, both positions cannot be
simultaneously true. Scholars may find the idea of growth-retarding institutions a source of
inspiration for research purposes.
To conclude, I would like to state the obvious. Overlooking the details, there are about 30
countries in which the political system has been able to provide the conditions for economic
affluence and prosperity to take place. With 30 cases in record, it should not be that difficult to
build a reach country on purpose.
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Country

Selected References on Candidate Selection

DZA

Algeria

African Personal Rule: Jackson and Rosberg (1982a,b,
1994), Young and Turner (1985), Bratton and van de Walle
(1997), Van de Walle (2001). African Party Politics:
Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet (2003), Salih (2003)

ARG

Argentina

AUS

Australia

AUT

Austria

BGD

Bangladesh

Escudero (2001), De Luca, Jones and Tula (2002), Jones
(2002)
Jupp (1964), Epstein (1977, 1980), Weller (1983),
Gallagher (1988b), Norris, Carty, Erickson, Lovenduski
and Simms (1990), Studlar and McAllister (1991), Simms
(1993, 1996), McAllister (1997), Parkin (1999), Simms and
Warhurst (2000)
Gallagher (1988b), Müller (1992, 1994), Mair (1994),
O'Regan (1999), Bille (2001), Gallagher, Laver and Mair
(2001)
Baxter (1999)

BEL

Belgium

BOL
BWA

Bolivia
Botswana

Obler (1974), Epstein (1980), De Winter (1988), Gallagher
(1988b), Deschouwer (1992, 1994), Mair (1994), Andrews
(1999), Bille (2001), Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2001),
Pennings and Hazan (2001)
Gamarra and Malloy (1995), Lucero (1999)
Dale (1999), Kopecký and Mair (2003: 317). African
Personal Rule: Jackson and Rosberg (1982a,b, 1994),
Young and Turner (1985), Bratton and van de Walle
(1997), Van de Walle (2001). African Party Politics:
Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet (2003), Salih (2003)

BRA

Brazil

Mainwaring (1995), Guzman and Sena de Oliveira (2001)

CMR

Cameroon

CAN

Canada

DeLancey (1999). African Personal Rule: Jackson and
Rosberg (1982a,b, 1994), Young and Turner (1985),
Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Van de Walle (2001).
African Party Politics: Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet
(2003), Salih (2003)
Siegfried (1966) [1906], Dawson (1947), Scarrow (1964),
Perlin (1975), Epstein (1980), Williams (1981), Landes
(1983), Jackson, Jackson and Baxter-Moore (1986),
Gallagher (1988a,b), Norris, Carty, Erickson, Lovenduski
and Simms (1990), Carty and Erickson (1991), Erickson
and Carty (1991), Erickson (1993), Norris (1996), Erickson
(1997), Sayers (1999), Carty, Cross and Young (2000),
Pennings and Hazan (2001), Cross (2002)
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Central
African
Republic

CHL
COL
CRI

Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica

DNK

Denmark

DOM
ECU

Dominican
Republic
Ecuador

SLV
ETH

El Salvador
Ethiopia

FIN

Finland

FRA

France

GER

Germany

GRC
GTM
HND

Greece
Guatemala
Honduras

ISL

Iceland

O'Toole (1999). African Personal Rule: Jackson and
Rosberg (1982a,b, 1994), Young and Turner (1985),
Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Van de Walle (2001).
African Party Politics: Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet
(2003), Salih (2003)
Scully (1995), Siavelis (2002)
Duff (1971), Gallagher (1988b), Archer (1995)
Taylor (1992), Carey (1996, 1997), Taylor-Robinson
(2001)
Fitzmaurice (1981), Bille (1992, 1994, 2001), Mair (1994),
Thomas (1999), Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2001),
Pennings and Hazan (2001), Pedersen, Bille, Buch, Elklit,
Hansen and Nielsen (2004)
Alum and Wessman (1999)
Legislative reelection allowed 1996 thereafter. Schodt
(1999)
Crisp (2000)
Abbink (1999). African Personal Rule: Jackson and
Rosberg (1982a,b, 1994), Young and Turner (1985),
Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Van de Walle (2001).
African Party Politics: Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet
(2003), Salih (2003)
Arter (1980), Elder, Ranney (1981), Thomas and Arter
(1982), Thomas (1985), Gallagher (1988b), Sundberg and
Gylling (1992), Sundberg (1994), Helander (1997), Farrell
(1999), Bille (2001), Pennings and Hazan (2001),
Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2001)
Thiébault (1988), Frears (1991), Andrews (1999), Evans
(2003), Knapp (2004)
Kitzinger
(1960),
Epstein
(1980),
Gallagher
(1988b),Roberts (1988), Bawn (1992), Poguntke and Boll
(1992), Kolinsky (1993), Mair (1994), Poguntke (1994),
Norris (1996), Wessels (1997), Smith (1999), Bille (2001),
Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2001), Korte (2003)
Kohler (1982), Gallagher (1988a,b)
Rosada (1992)
Morris (1984), Rosenberg (1989), Norsworthy and Barry
(1993), Taylor (1996)
Hardarson (1995, 1999), Kristjánsson (1998), Gallagher,
Laver and Mair (2001), Hazan (2002)
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IND

India

IRL

Ireland

ISR

Israel

ITA

Italy

JPN

Japan

KOR

Korea, Rep.

LUX
MDG

Luxembourg
Madagascar

MWI

Malawi

MYS
MLI

Malaysia
Mali

MEX

Mexico

MOZ

Mozambique

Weiner (1967, 1987), Gallagher (1988b), Alam (1992),
Dasgupta (2002), Jana and Sarmah (2002), Report
Submitted by The National Commission to Review the
Working of the Constitution, Ministry of Law and Justice,
Government
of
India,
2002,
available
at
www.lawmin.nic.in, Arora (2003), Godbole (2003), Gosh
(2003), Chandra (2004)
Gallagher (1988b,c), Galligan (1993), Farrell (1992, 1994),
Mair (1994), Ward (1999), Bille (2001), Gallagher, Laver
and Mair (2001), Pennings and Hazan (2001)
Kraines (1961), Seligman (1964), Epstein (1980), Goldberg
(1980), Doron and Goldberg (1990), Arian and Shamir
(1999), Hazan (1999), Rahat and Sher-Hadar (1999),
Hazan and Rahat (2000), Rahat and Hazan (2001), Hazan
(2002), Lundell (2004)
Wertman (1988), Gallagher (1988b), Bardi and Morlino
(1992, 1994), Guadagnini (1993), Bille (2001)
Gallagher (1988a,b), Shiratori (1988), Fukai and Fukui
(1992), Hrebenar (1992), Fukui (1997)
Thornton and Kovick (2003)
Andrews (1999), Lundell (2002, 2004)
Meyers (1999). African Personal Rule: Jackson and
Rosberg (1982a,b, 1994), Young and Turner (1985),
Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Van de Walle (2001).
African Party Politics: Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet
(2003), Salih (2003)
Lanz (1999). African Personal Rule: Jackson and Rosberg
(1982a,b, 1994), Young and Turner (1985), Bratton and
van de Walle (1997), Van de Walle (2001). African Party
Politics: Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet (2003), Salih
(2003)
Hing and Ong (1987), Thornton (2003)
Imperato (1999). African Personal Rule: Jackson and
Rosberg (1982a,b, 1994), Young and Turner (1985),
Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Van de Walle (2001).
African Party Politics: Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet
(2003), Salih (2003)
No (immediate) legislative reelection. Story (1992), Camp
(1993), Craig and Cornelius (1995), Casar (2002), Nacif
(2002), Langston (2006), Wuhs (2006)
Griffiths (1999). African Personal Rule: Jackson and
Rosberg (1982a,b, 1994), Young and Turner (1985),
Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Van de Walle (2001).
African Party Politics: Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet
(2003), Salih (2003)
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NPL
NLD

Nepal
Netherlands

Wallem and Guragain (2003)
Gallagher (1988a,b), Koole and Leijenaar (1988), Koole
and van de Velde (1992), Leijenaar (1993), Koole (1994),
Mair (1994), Leijenaar and Niemöller (1997), Andrews
(1999), Bille (2001), Hazan (2002)

NZL

New Zealand

NIC
NGA
NOR

Nicaragua
Nigeria
Norway

Epstein (1980), Jackson (1980), Gallagher (1988a,b),
Mulgan (1994), Catt (1997)
Oquist (1992), Prevost (1992), LeoGrande (1992)
Bienen (1987)
Valen and Katz (1964), Epstein (1980), Gallagher (1988b),
Valen (1966, 1988), Svåsand (1992, 1994), Madeley and
Kadel (1999), Bille (2001), Gallagher, Laver and Mair
(2001), Pennings and Hazan (2001)

PAN
PRY
PER
PHL

Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines

PRT

Portugal

ZAF

South Africa

SEN

Senegal

SLE

Sierra Leone

SGP
ESP

Singapore
Spain

LKA

Sri Lanka

Liss (1992), Smith (1992)
Deiner (1992), Abente (1995), Williams (1999)
Cotler (1995), Schmidt (1999)
limited (3 terms) legislative reelection. Arlegue and
Coronel (2003)
Bruneau and Macleod (1986), Gallagher, Laver and Mair
(1992), Colomer (1996), Norris (1996), Black (1999)
Meyers (1999). African Personal Rule: Jackson and
Rosberg (1982a,b, 1994), Young and Turner (1985),
Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Van de Walle (2001).
African Party Politics: Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet
(2003), Salih (2003)
Darling and Menkhaus (1999). African Personal Rule:
Jackson and Rosberg (1982a,b, 1994), Young and Turner
(1985), Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Van de Walle
(2001). African Party Politics: Cranenburgh (2003),
Doorenspleet (2003), Salih (2003)
Metz and Elliott (1999). African Personal Rule: Jackson
and Rosberg (1982a,b, 1994), Young and Turner (1985),
Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Van de Walle (2001).
African Party Politics: Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet
(2003), Salih (2003)
Roberts (1999), Mutalib (2003)
De Esteban and López-Guerra (1985), Colomer (1996),
Boix (1998), Black (1999), Hopkin and Paolucci (1999),
Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2001), Hopkin (2001), Lundell
(2004)
Kearney (1987), Samaranayake (1999)
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SWE

Sweden

Epstein (1980), Elder, Thomas and Arter (1982), Sainsbury
(1993), Pierre and Widfeldt (1992, 1994), Norris (1996),
Elder (1999), Bille (2001), Gallagher, Laver and Mair
(2001), Pennings and Hazan (2001)

CHE

Switzerland

TWN
THA
TUN

Taiwan
Thailand
Tunisia

TUR
GBR

Turkey
United
Kingdom

USA

United States

URY

Uruguay

Steiner (1974, 1998), Steiner and Dorff (1980), Norris
(1996), Hass (1999), Lundell (2004)
Kovick (2003)
Thornton (2003)
Penner (1999). African Personal Rule: Jackson and
Rosberg (1982a,b, 1994), Young and Turner (1985),
Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Van de Walle (2001).
African Party Politics: Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet
(2003), Salih (2003)
Özbudun (1987, 2000), Sayari (2002)
Jennings (1961), Ranney (1965), Czudnowski (1975),
Epstein (1980), Denver (1988), Norris, Carty, Erickson,
Lovenduski and Simms (1990), Punnett (1992), Webb
(1992, 1994), Norris (1996), Norris and Lovenduski (1993,
1995, 1997), Andrews (1999), Gallagher, Laver and Mair
(2001), Hopkin (2001), Pennings and Hazan (2001), Hazan
(2002)
Mayhew (1974), Czudnowski (1975), Ranney (1981),
Epstein (1980, 1986), Gallagher (1988a,b), Kolodny and
Katz (1992), Burrell (1993), Fowler (1993), Katz and
Kolodny (1994), Stanley and Niemi (1988-2006), Norris
(1996), Herrnson (1997), Pennings and Hazan (2001),
Hazan (2002)
González (1995), Taylor (1996)

VEN

Venezuela,
RB
Zambia

ZMB

Wells (1980), Levine (1987), Gallagher (1988b), Hillman
(1994), Kornblith and Levine (1995), Kulisheck (1999)
Hendricks (1999). African Personal Rule: Jackson and
Rosberg (1982a,b, 1994), Young and Turner (1985),
Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Van de Walle (2001).
African Party Politics: Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet
(2003), Salih (2003)
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Abente, Diego (1995) “A Party System in Transition: The Case of Paraguay”, pp. 298320, in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully (eds.) Building Democratic Institutions:
Party Systems in Latin America. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
Abbink, Jon (1999) "Ethiopia", pp. 348-352, in George E. Delury and Deborah A. Kaple
(eds.) World Encyclopedia of Political Systems and Parties. 3rd edition. New York, NY:
Facts On File, Inc.
Alam, Javeed (1992) “Congress Party: Consensus Politics to Autocratic Regime”,
Economic and Political Weekly, July 16-17.
Alum, Rolando A., Jr. and James Wessman (1999) “Dominican Republic”, pp. 305-311,
in George E. Delury and Deborah A. Kaple (eds.) World Encyclopedia of Political
Systems and Parties. 3rd edition. New York, NY: Facts On File, Inc.
Andrews, William G. (1999) "Kingdom of Belgium", pp. 97-105, in George E. Delury
and Deborah A. Kaple (eds.) World Encyclopedia of Political Systems and Parties. 3rd
edition. New York, NY: Facts On File, Inc.
Andrews, William G. (1999) " Grand Duchy of Luxembourg", pp. 685-688, in George E.
Delury and Deborah A. Kaple (eds.) World Encyclopedia of Political Systems and
Parties. 3rd edition. New York, NY: Facts On File, Inc.
Andrews, William G. (1999) "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland",
pp. 1154-1169, in George E. Delury and Deborah A. Kaple (eds.) World Encyclopedia of
Political Systems and Parties. 3rd edition. New York, NY: Facts On File, Inc.
Andrews, William G. (1999) "Republic of France", pp. 366-385, in George E. Delury and
Deborah A. Kaple (eds.) World Encyclopedia of Political Systems and Parties. 3rd
edition. New York, NY: Facts On File, Inc.
Andrews, William G. (1999) "Kingdom of the Netherlands", pp. 780-789, in George E.
Delury and Deborah A. Kaple (eds.) World Encyclopedia of Political Systems and
Parties. 3rd edition. New York, NY: Facts On File, Inc.
Archer, Ronald P. (1995) “Party Strength and Weakness in Colombia’s Besieged
Democracy”, pp. 164-199, in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully (eds.) Building
Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press.
Arlegue, Celito and John Joseph S. Coronel (2003) “Philippines”, pp. 217-262, in Peter
M. Manikas and Laura L. Thornton (eds.) Political Parties in Asia: Promoting Reform
and Combating Corruption in Eight Countries. Washington, DC: National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs.
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Arora, Balveer (2003) “Federalisation of India’s Party System”, pp. 83-99, in Ajay K.
Mehra, D.D. Khanna and Gert W. Kueck (eds.) Political Parties and Party Systems. New
Delhi, Thousand Oaks, London: SAGE Publications.
Arter, David (1980) “Social Democracy in a Western European Outpost: The Case of the
Finnish SDP”, Polity, 12 (3): 363-387.
Bardi, Luciano and Leonardo Morlino (1994) “Italy: Tracing the Roots of the Great
Transformation”, pp. 242-277, in Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds.) How Parties
Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies.
London: Sage Publications, Inc.
Bardi, Luciano and Leonardo Morlino (1992) “Italy”, pp. 458-618, in Richard S. Katz
and Peter Mair (eds.) Party Organizations: A Data Handbook on Party Organizations in
Western Democracies, 1960-90. London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage Publications.
Bawn, Kathleen (1992) Institutional Arrangements and Legislative Behavior: the Politics
of Institutional Choice. A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of Economics and
the Committee on Graduate Studies of Stanford University.
Baxter, Craig (1999) “People’s Republic of Bangladesh”, pp. 84-90, in George E. Delury
and Deborah A. Kaple (eds.) World Encyclopedia of Political Systems and Parties. 3rd
Edition. New York, NY: Facts On File, Inc.
Bienen, Henry (1987) “Nigeria”, pp. 201-247, in Myron Weiner and Ergun Özbudun
(eds.) Competitive Elections in Developing Countries. Durham, North Carolina: Duke
University Press and the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
Bille, Lars (2001) “Democratizing a Democratic Procedure: Myth or Reality?: Candidate
Selection in Western European Parties, 1960-1990”, Party Politics, 7 (3): 363-380.
Bille, Lars (1994) “Denmark: The Decline of the Membership Party?”, pp. 134-157, in
Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds.) How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in
Party Organizations in Western Democracies. London: Sage Publications.
Bille, Lars (1992) “Denmark”, pp. 199-272, in Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds.)
Party Organizations: A Data Handbook on Party Organizations in Western
Democracies, 1960-90. London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage Publications.
Black, Jan Knippers (1999) "Kingdom of Spain", pp. 1021-1033, in George E. Delury
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